The Jains against the Materialists

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approx. date	title	reference
?	Śṛṅgāraśataka of Bhartṛhari	Kosambi 1948
~ 500 ce?	Yuktyanuśāsanam of Samantabhadra	Mukhtāra 1951
~ 650 ce	Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti	Gnoli 1960
~ 750 се	Tattvōpaplavasimha of Jayarāśi	Franco 1987
~ 780 се	Siddhiviniścayavivarana of Akalanka	Jain 1959
~ 780 се	Tattvasangrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla	Krishnamacharya 1926
~ 810 ce	Pramāṇavārttikālankārabhāṣya of Prajñākaragupta	Sānkṛityāyana 1953
~ 830 се	Ādipurāna of Jinasēna	Jain 2004 [1950]
~ 900 ce	Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta	Gaurinath 1982–1984
~ 900 ce	Āgamadambara of Jayanta	Dezső 2005
~ 940 ce	Satyaśāsanaparīksā of Vidyānandin	Jain 1964
959 CE	Yaśastilakacampū of Sōmadēva	Sundarlal Shastri 1989, Śivadatta and Parab 1903
~ 990 ce	Pramēyaratnamālā of Anantavīrya	Jain 1927
~ 1500 се	Śrutasāgarī Ṭīkā on Āśādhara's Jinasahasranāma by Śrutasāgara	Jain 1954

Direct sources:

- **Vidyānandin** (especially his *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*, which is often quoted word-for-word, and which is the source of many of the verses quoted in the *Yaśastilaka*)
- **Prajñākaragupta** (especially his commentary on the *Janmāntarasiddhi* section of the *Pramānavārttika*, 1.34−35; see Franco 1997)
- Jinasēna (Mahāmati in Ādipurāṇa 5 is a parallel character to Caṇḍakarman, and there are verbal parallels with Sōmadēva's Upāsakādhyayana)
- Dharmakīrti (although he could have gotten the verses cited from other sources)

Indirect sources (?):

- Bṛhaspatisūtras (quoted by almost everyone, but very unlikely to have been directly available to Sōmadēva)
- Jayarāśi (quoted by Vidyānandin and Anantavīrya often, and maybe even by Akalaṅka; could well have been available to Sōmadēva)
- Jayanta (Vrddhārambhin in the Āgamaḍambara is a parallel character to Caṇḍakarman; possibly his Nyāyamañjarī was known to Vidyānandin?)

Non-sources (?):

■ Haribhadra, who talks about materialism in many places (Lōkatattvanirṇaya, Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya, Samarāiccakahā), but he belonged to the wrong religion. (Pingaka in the Samarāiccakahā could have been a parallel character to Caṇḍakarman.)

Note that I found that Śrutasāgara quotes much of this passage in Śrutasāgarī Ṭīkā p. 224, usually with better readings. I suspect that Puṣpadanta, the Apabhramsha poet and a slightly later contemporary of Sōmadēva, knew of the latter's Yaśastilaka, since there are elements of his treatment of the debate between Mahāmati and Svayambuddhi in his Mahāpurāṇu (a rendition of Jinasēna's Ādipurāṇa) that cannot be explained from his utilization of Jinasēna alone.

sugatakīrtiн — [...] ēvam ca sati kēśōlluñcanataptaśilārōhaṇakēśadarśanāśabrahmacaryādayaḥ kēvalam ātmōpaghātāyaiva. tad uktam — If all this is the case, then pulling out your hair, standing on heated stones, [...] celibacy, and so on is just torturing yourself. As has been said:

so KM; Sundarlal Shastri reads nāśavināśa and suggests केश के दिखाई देने पर भोजन का त्याग.

vēdaprāmāṇyam kasyacitkartrvādaḥ snānē dharmēcchā jātivādāvalēpaḥ santāpārambhaḥ klēśanāśāya cēti dhvastaprajñānām pañcalingāni jāḍyē There are five signs that stupidity has prevailed over insight: thinking the Vedas are an authority; saying that anything has a creator; seeking merit in taking a bath; taking pride in the doctrine of caste; and undertaking austerities to remove distress.

quoted from Pramāṇavārttika (svārthānumāna chapter) v. 340 (pāpahāṇāya for klēśanāśāya; prajñānē for prajñānam)

idam ēva ca tattvam upalabhyālāpi nīlapaţēna —

payōdharabharālasāḥ smaravighūrṇitārdhēkṣaṇā kvacit salayapañcamōccaritagītabhaṅkāriṇīḥ vihāya ramaṇīr amūraparamōkṣasaukhyārthinām ahō jaḍimaḍiṇḍimō viphalabhaṇḍapākhaṇḍinām

[Taking some readings from the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā.]

And Nīlapaṭa has expressed this very same state of affairs:

Moving slowly because of the weight of their breasts, casting alluring sidelong glances, sometimes singing the fifth note [...]—these beautiful women the heretics spurn, vainly and stupidly, seeking a happiness, liberation, that is immaterial and distant, loudly proclaiming their own idiocy.

quoted from (?) *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* p. 15 (*kvacinmalaya* for *kvacitsalaya*; *bhankāriṇīḥ* for *ḍankāriṇaḥ*; *bhanḍa* for *bhaṇḍi*) Handiqui (1968: 441) suggests identifying this person with a poet named Nīlapatta cited in the *Saduktikarnāmrta*.

strīmudrām jhaṣakētanasya mahatīm sarvārthasampatkarīm yē mōhādavadhīrayanti kudhiyō mithyāphalānvēṣiṇaḥ tē tēnaiva nihatya nirdayataram muṇḍīkṛtā luñcitāḥ kēcit pañcaśikhīkṛtāś ca jaṭinaḥ kāpālikāś cāparē

Those idiots who seek after bogus results and foolishly disdain the great treasure of Kāmadēva, sealed by woman—some of them pull out their own hair, some of them stand between five fires, and some become skull-carrying ascetics.

quoted from Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā p. 15 (nirvāṇa for sarvārtha, bhasmīkṛtā for muṇdīkṛtā)

in turn **quoted from** Śṛṅgāraśataka 113, p. 45 (jayatīm for mahatīm, mūḍhāḥ for mōhād, pravihāya yānti for avadhīrayanti, nagnīkṛtā muṇḍitāḥ for muṇḍīkṛtā luñcitāḥ)

сарракаямā — sādhv āha khalu sugatakīrtih. yatah —

paśyanti yē janma mṛtasya jantōh paśyanti yē dharmam adṛstasādhyam paśyanti yē 'nyam purusam śarīrāt paśyanti tē nīlakapītakāni

Very well said, Sugatakīrti. After all:

Those who see the birth of a dead being, who see *dharma* as what is to be accomplished by invisible forces, who see a person other than the body those people are hallucinating.

Sundarlal (p. 156) takes this as "seeing yellow things as black and black things as yellow" (भ्रमवश नीलक (नीलवर्णवाली वस्तु) को पीतक (पीतवर्णवाली) समझते हैं और पीतवर्णवाली वस्तु की नील वर्ण वाली समझते हैं)

tataś ca prānāpānasamānōdānavyānavyatikīrnēbhyah kāyākāraparinatisankīrnebhyō vanapavanāvanipavanasakhyēbhyah pistodakagudadhātakīpramukhēbhya iva madaśaktih parnacūrnakramukēbhya iva rāgasampattis tadātmakāryagunasvabhāvatayā caitanyam upajāyatē.

And for that reason consciousness arises from water, air, earth and fire when they make up a complex transformation in the form of a body, and when they are passed over by the five breaths, just like the power of intoxication arises from flour, water, jaggery, and dhātakī, and just like a rich red color arises from betel leaf, lime powder, and areca nut, and it does so insofar as it is either identical to, an effect, of, or a quality of those material elements.

probably **adapted from** Satyaśāsanaparīksā p. 15: kāyākāraparinatēbhyas tēbhyah pistōdakagudadhātakīsamyōgān madaśaktivān, snāyulābūdandānguthānguliprayatnācchravanaramanīyakavanitavac ca tadātmakam caitanyam jāyatē. For tadātmakam and tadātmakāryagunasvabhāvatayā see dēhātmikā below. Compare Mahāpurāņu 20.17.4: gulajalapiṭṭhahim mayasatti jēma ~ bhūēsu jīu sambhavai tēma.

tam patram iva na punah prarōhati.

tac ca garbhādimaranaparyantaparyāyam atītam sat pādapāt pati- And that subsists from birth until death. When it's gone, it never returns, like a leaf fallen from a tree.

probably adapted from Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā p. 15: tac ca garbhādimaraṇaparyantam jīva ātmā ityādi vyapadēśabhāk pravartatē. garbhāt pūrvakālē maraṇād uttarakālē ca tadabhāvah.

tathā ca paralōkinō 'bhāvāt paralōkābhāvē

And thus, given that because there is nothing that goes to the next world, there is no next world,

[KM: tathā ca paralōkabhāvē, Sundarlal: tathā ca paralōkābhāvē]

probably **quoted from** Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā p. 15: tataḥ paralōkinō bhāvaḥ, paralōkinō 'bhāvāt paralōkasyāpyabhāva.

This is probably originally from the Brhaspatisūtras (Bhattacharya 2011 [2002]: IV.2); see Āgamadambara p. 170 and Tattvōpaplavasimha p. 228.

jalabudbudasvabhāvēsu jīvēsu, madašaktipratijnānē ca vijnānē

and given that individual lives have the nature of bubbles in water, and given that consciousness is like the power of intoxication,

[Śrutasāgarī has ca vijñāna; Sundarlal and KM don't.]

probably quoted from Siddhiviniścayavivarana p. 283: jalabudbudavaj jīvāh, madašaktivad vijñānam; see also Ādipurāna 5.32 jalabudbudavaj jīvāh; 5.30 cētanā [...] madaśaktivat and Vārtikālankāra p. 54: madaśaktivad vijñānam

This is probably originally from the *Brhaspatisūtras* (Bhattacharya 2011 [2002]: I.9)

kimarthō 'yam lōkasyātmasapatnah prayatnah.

tad apahāyāmīṣām jīvanmrtamanīṣāṇām manīṣitam ētat kuśalāśrayair āśrēyam.

[Śrutasāgarī: kuśalāśayair; Sundarlal: kuśalāśrayair; KM: kulāśrayair.]

yāvaj jīvēt sukham jīvēn nāsti mṛtyōr agōcaraḥ bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanam kutah

[KM, Sundarlal: śāntasya; Śrutasāgarī: kāyasya.] **quoted from** Satyaśāsanaparīksā p. 15 (dēhasya for śāntasya).

why do people do these things that simply hurt themselves?

It would be much better, if your heart is still working, to forget about the wisdom of those guys whose greatest idea is a living death, and abide by the following:

One should live comfortably as long as one lives.

Nobody is beyond the reach of death. When someone is at rest, and turned to ashes, how can they ever come back?

A traditional verse often cited in connection with materialists (Bhattacharya 2011 [2002]: Śl.7); cited in *Tattvasangrahapañjikā* p. 17, *Nyāyamañjarī* 1.388 and 2.257 (the latter in the discussion of the views of the *suśiksitāś cārvākāh* = Udbhata?); *Visnudharmōttarapurāna* 108.18–19.

BHAGAVĀN — [...]

Sundarlal: bhagavān; KM: bhagavan.

tadaharjastanēhātō rakṣōdṛṣṭēr bhavasmṛtēḥ bhūtānanvayanāj jīvah prakrtijñah sanātanah

quoted from Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā p. 18; see also $\bar{A}dipurāṇa$ 5.70 $(j\bar{a}tyanusmaran\bar{a}t)$.

also in the *Upāsakādhyayana* (*Yaśastilaka* ch. 6); also quoted in *Pramēyaratnamālā*, p. 187

pṛthivyādivad ātmāyam anādyanidhanātmakaḥ madhyē sattvāt kutas tattvam anyathā tava sidhyati The individual self is eternal and the knower by nature, because of

- (1) the desire that a newborn baby has for the breast;
- (2) the observation of Rāksasas;
- (3) the recollection of past lives;
- (4) the fact that it cannot arise from matter.

Just like the material elements, this self is without beginning or end, because it exists amid them: what other conclusion could you come to? kāyākārēṣu bhūtēṣu cittam vyaktim avāpnuvat tadātmaguṇakāryatvaiḥ prakalpēta yadi tvayā jalān muktānalaḥ kāṣṭhāc candrakāntāt payaḥplavaḥ bhavan vyajanatō vāyus tattvasaṅkhyām vihāpayēt

[Sundarlal kāṣṭhāc; KM kaṣṭāc. For tadātmaguṇakāryatvaiḥ see dēhāt-mikā below.]

adapted from Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā p. 16 (pṛthivyātmakacandrakāntasūryakāntakāṣṭhaviśēṣēbhyō jalānalayōr utpattēḥ, pradīpajalavišēṣābhyām pṛthvīrūpāñjanamuktāphalayōḥ, pṛthvīviśēṣatālavṛntādēr vāyōh sāksādvīksanāt)

jalādiṣu tirōbhūtā durvarādēs tadudbhavē dharādiṣu tirōbhūtā cittācittam apīṣyatām

[Not entirely clear to me yet.]

pumsi tiṣṭhati tiṣṭhanti śarīrēndriyadhātavaḥ yānti yātē 'nyathaitāsām sattvē sattvam prasajyatām

viruddhaguṇasaṁsargād ātmā bhūtātmakō na hi bhūjalānalavātānām anyathā na vyavasthitiḥ vijñānasukhaduḥkhādiguṇaliṅgaḥ pumān ayam dhāraṇēraṇadāhādidharmādhārādharādayaḥ

maybe an echo of *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* p. 16 (*sō 'yam ātmā harṣa-viṣādādyanēkākāravivartaḥ*), p. 17 (*dhāraṇēraṇadravōṣṇatārūpēṇa bhūtasādṛśyābhāvāt*).

If you were to postulate that consciousness becomes manifest when matter takes the form of a body, on account of its being identical to it, a property of it, or an effect of it, then you would have to eliminate matter itself from your list of elements, since a pearl comes from water, fire comes from wood, liquid comes from the *candrakānta* stone, and air from a fan.

You might say that they are hidden in water and so on. But since durvara and so on originate from that as well, they would have to be hidden in earth and so on. And in that case you would have to accept both what is conscious and what is not.

While a person abides, the elements of his body and faculties abide, but they go when he goes: in fact, given the existence of these elements otherwise, the existence [of the individual soul] should follow as a consequence.

The self is not material because it cannot arise from things that have contrary qualities [to it]. Otherwise, there would be no difference [between it] and earth, water, fire, and wind. This person is recognized by the properties of awareness, pleasure, pain, and so on, whereas they are the basis for properties such as heaviness, forward motion, burning, and so on.

atha matam —

pittaprakṛtir dhīmān mēdhāvī krōdhanō 'lpakāmaś ca prasvēdy akālapalitō bhavati narō nātra sandēhaḥ

[Partial parallels, e.g., in the *Pārāśarahōraśāstra*.]

tan na pravarham —

vrddhihānī yathāgnēḥ stām ēdhōtkarṣāpakarṣataḥ pittādhikōnabhāvābhyām buddhēḥ samprāpnutas tathā

[yathāgnēḥ stām ēdhō Sundarlal; yathāgnēstāmēdhau KM]

gurūpāsanam abhyāsō viśēṣaḥ śāstraniścayē iti dṛstasya hānih syāt tatha ca tava darśanē

kutaścit pittanāśē 'pi buddhēr atiśayē kṣaṇāt kutaḥ prabhavabhāvō 'tra syād bījāṅkurayōr iva

maybe an echo of *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* p. 16 (*bījādēr aṅkurādēr api tattvāmtaratvaprasaṅgāt*).

buddhim prati yadīṣyatē pittasya sahakāritā kā nō hānir bhavatv ēvam nālavrddhau yathāmbhasaḥ

ēvam ca satīdam na kimcit

dēhātmikā dēhakāryā dēhasya ca guņō matiḥ matatrayam samāśritya nāstyabhyāsasya sambhavaḥ

quoted from *Vārtikālankāra* 2.378 (p. 53)

tattvajñānam ca jalādijñānam ivāvihitānuṣṭhānam na bhavati samsāratṛṣṇōpaśāntikaraṇam.

You might think:

A man with a bilious constitution might be wise, clever, rascible, with a low libido, sweaty, and prematurely gray. Have no doubt about it.

That's not great.

Just as the increase and decrease of a fire come from the addition and subtraction of fuel, in the same way, the increase and decrease of intelligence would have to come from a higher or lower quantity of bile.

When it comes to learning texts, studying with teachers and practice are what makes the difference: but that, which we observe, would be given up on your view.

Now if intelligence were to somehow increase, even if for just a moment, while bile diminished, then how could you say that one is the source of the other, as in the case of a seed and a sprout?

If you maintain that bile merely assists with respect to intelligence, that does no damage to our position, just like water with respect to the growth of a stalk.

And if this is the case, the following is something, isn't it?

On any of these three views — that intellect is itself the body, that it is an effect of the body, or that it is a quality of the body — practice would be impossible.

And knowledge of reality is not an instrument for overcoming the thirst for continued existence if it is not put into practice, just like the knowledge of water and so on.

iva na samyujyatē phalaih.

asañjātatadarthakriyārambhah samadhigatētikartavyō 'pi kṛṣīlava Someone who doesn't even begin purposive action toward it, even if he understands the procedure, will not experience the results, just like an actor.

[read kuśīlava?]

tataś ca —

tattvam guröh samadhigamya yathartharūpam tadbhāvabhāvanamanōrathanirvrtātmā āyāsya kāyam anavadyatayā tapōbhir jantuh param padam upaiti yathā ksitīśah

anāyāsyakāyam sēvaka ivātmavān api na labhatē parām padavīm. But without exerting one's body, even if one has a self, one will not obtain the highest state, just like a servant. And for that reason:

> Having learned of the way things really are from a teacher, having exerted his body with asceticism and satisfied his soul [...] a being reaches the highest position, just like a king.

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