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Rasa as Sentence Meaning

Andrew Ollett

Rasa is a technical term which refers to a particular kind of emotional experience. It is generally reserved for emotions associated with works of art—that is, the emotions that are either represented in a work of art or according to the theory that would later come to dominate South Asian aesthetic thought, the emotions that a work of art engenders in the sensitive reader, spectator, or listener. The major discussions of rasa among intellectuals who wrote in Sanskrit have recently been presented in Sheldon Pollock’s Rasa Reader, which also frames those discussions in an intellectual-historical narrative (Pollock 2016). Many of the authors who have written about rasa have described it as a “meaning,” an artha, of a literary text. A few of them, namely Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (late ninth century) and Dhanika (late tenth century), have described it more specifically as a kind of “sentence meaning,” or vākyārtha. It is this equation, rasa as sentence meaning, that is the focus of this chapter: Precisely what does it mean to call rasa a sentence meaning, and what conceptual resources were drawn upon to make this equation?

In the most basic sense, what we call the “meaning” of a linguistic expression is the content of the awareness that is produced by that linguistic expression. Hence, if I show you the word “cow,” you are likely to think of a cow. Rasa is, for its part, a kind of emotional experience, or perhaps more generally an affective state. As Pollock has demonstrated in his Reader, there were two competing positions, not always clearly articulated or distinguished from each other, regarding the locus of this affective state: Does rasa exist in the character, or in the reader? Thus we might consider rasa to be the meaning of a text either if it is an affective state in the character that the reader understands on the basis of the text or, alternatively, if it is an affective state in the reader herself that, once again, is produced on the basis of the text. Either way, however, there are certain problems associated with understanding rasa as a meaning. At the very
least, if the equation is to hold, we are going to need a more sophisticated theory of meaning than a semiotic one which merely pairs linguistic expressions with mental states.

The main arguments against thinking of rasa as a meaning in the narrowly semiotic sense were already clearly enunciated by Ānandavardhana, around 875 CE, in his revolutionary monograph, the Light on Resonance (Dhvanyālokaḥ) (see Pollock 2016, 90). Ānandavardhana himself did consider rasa—or more precisely rasādiḥ, a large set of elements that form part of the overall experience of a rasa, including intermediate affective states, psychophysical responses, and so on—to be a meaning, but it was precisely the inexpressibility of such a meaning through the standard “language functions” (śabdavyāpārāh) that led him to posit manifestation (vyāñjanā) as an additional function.

Ānandavardhana’s argument can be paraphrased as follows. Whereas a linguistic expression expresses its meaning, it does not seem to be the case that a literary text expresses a rasa. This is for two reasons, one pertaining to the supposed signer, and one to the supposed signified.

To begin with, we don’t seem to owe our awareness of a rasa in the character—and, as Pollock (2012) has argued, Ānandavardhana thinks of rasa primarily as located in the character rather than in the reader—to linguistic expressions as such. Ānandavardhana claimed, somewhat controversially, that one cannot successfully convey a rasa simply by using the words for it, for instance, “amazing,” or “heroic,” or “erotic,” and so on. Showing is more effective than telling. Authors instead speak of an aggregate of “aesthetic elements,” comprising foundational factors (ālambana-vibhāvaḥ), stimulant factors (uddipana-vibhāvaḥ), reactions (anubhāvaḥ), psychophysical responses (sāttvikā-nubhāvaḥ), and transitory emotions (vyabhicāri-bhāvaḥ), which jointly raise a particular stable emotion (sthāyi-bhāvaḥ) to the level of a rasa. But if the cause of rasa is an aggregate, then it is no longer similar in this respect to a word meaning, which is expressed by a single word. It may, however, be similar to a sentence meaning, given that the awareness of sentence meanings arises, according to one view, from an aggregate of word meanings, just as the awareness (or experience) of rasa arises from the aesthetic elements in aggregate.

The analogy of sentence meaning might also help to solve another problem: if rasas really are produced by an aggregate of aesthetic elements, given the fact that the aesthetic elements are not linguistic expressions, either individually or in aggregate, is it really possible to say that the aesthetic elements “express” a rasa? Surely, however, those aesthetic elements are themselves expressed by linguistic expressions, just as word meanings, out of which sentence meaning
arises, are expressed by linguistic expressions. Hence we may want to say that the literary text expresses a *rasa* in the same way that the words of a sentence express a sentence meaning.

On the side of the supposed signified, there appears to be an important qualitative difference between *rasa* and other kinds of meanings. What, after all, are the kinds of things that can be signified by a signifier, and especially by a linguistic expression? To begin with word meanings, we might think of them as intentional objects, and it is clear that we don’t experience intentional objects and affective states in the same way. Similarly, one might think of sentence meanings as either structured configurations of such intentional objects or something along the lines of propositions, which can be evaluated in truth-conditional terms. In either case, *rasa* is evidently something quite different, neither analyzable into intentional objects nor capable of evaluation as true or false. These two concepts of sentence meaning, however, might be unduly restrictive. If we adopt a view of sentence meaning as more directly related to action and experience, as several South Asian theorists did, then the gap between *rasa* and sentence meaning will shrink.

Thus, on the one hand, it does not seem possible to understand *rasa* as a meaning, if meaning is defined solely as what is literally expressed by a signifier. And for precisely this reason, theorists have favored verbs other than “express” to describe the relationship between the text and a *rasa*. Ānandavardhana led the way by claiming that a *rasa* could only ever be *manifested* (*vyakta*). In his wake, Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka would claim that *rasa* is *actualized* (*bhāvita*), and Mahima Bhāṭṭa would claim that it is *inferred* (*anumīta*). On the other hand, none of these thinkers denied that *rasa* is a meaning, and it might be possible to defend this equation if we entertain a different theory of meaning. As we have seen, the notion of sentence meaning offers a more promising parallel than that of word meaning.

In the debate that followed the *Light on Resonance*, the defenders of Ānandavardhana argued that *rasa* was a kind of meaning that could not be expressed, and therefore had to be manifested, while his opponents argued *rasa* could be expressed (see McCrea 2008). This debate unfolded over the course of about a century and a half, from 875 to 1025 CE. During this time, there were a number of interventions in the theory of *rasa* itself. The most critical of these interventions, as Pollock has argued, was Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka’s insistence that *rasa* was an experience that the reader had in response to a compelling work of literary art (see Pollock 2010, 2016, 144–80). There were also, however, a number of interventions in the theory of sentence meaning. Between the
late ninth and early eleventh century, the traditional theories of meaning were radically overhauled, revised, and elaborated. In this debate, then, there were two sets of moving parts. The answer to whether rasa could be thought of as expressed, either in the same way that a sentence meaning is expressed or, indeed, as a sentence meaning itself, thus depended on the models of sentence meaning that were available.

The three authors who argue most explicitly for the equation of rasa and sentence meaning are Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Dhanaṇḍiya, and Dhanika. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka probably composed his Mirror of the Heart (Hṛdayadarpaṇam), which only survives in fragments, in Kashmir around 900 CE. Dhanaṇḍiya wrote a work of dramaturgy called the Ten Dramatic Forms (Daśarūpakam), probably while at the court of Vākpati Muṇja in Malwa in the last quarter of the tenth century. Dhanika was likely Dhanaṇḍiya’s younger brother. As far as we can tell, his Observations (Avalokāḥ) on the Ten Dramatic Forms were composed in the second decade of the eleventh century. Pollock has argued convincingly that Dhanaṇḍiya and Dhanika were deeply influenced by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and in his Reader, he has treated their works as an “elaboration” of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s ideas (Pollock 2016, 154; see also Pollock 2010). Pollock did not, however, discuss another one of Dhanika’s sources, who was as important in shaping Dhanika’s views on sentence meaning as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was in shaping his views on rasa. This was Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta was an exact contemporary, and countryman, of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He, too, worked in Kashmir in the later part of the ninth century. His magnum opus was Racemose Reasoning (Nyāyamaṇjarī), a wide-ranging discussion of various aspects of the Nyāya philosophical system, and notable for its inclusion of many other philosophical perspectives, including those of Mīmāṃsā. In the book’s sixth chapter, Jayanta discusses two competing theories at length, one called “relation of expressed meanings” (abhihitānvayāḥ), and the other “expression of relational meanings” (anvitābhidhānam). These two positions were associated with two towering figures in the history of Mīmāṃsā: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was held to be a partisan of the “relation of expressed meanings,” although he himself never used the phrase, whereas Prabhākara self-consciously defended the “expression of relational meanings.”

If we look beyond Jayanta’s doxographic presentation, and toward the intellectual-historical landscape, we can see that Kumārila represented the older and common-sense view, while Prabhākara’s insistence that words could only express their meanings in the context of the sentence, and thus in relation to other word meanings, was a radical challenge to that view. It was in response
to that challenge that philosophers began to address the question of sentence meaning directly. One of the first to do so was Śālikanātha Miśra, Prabhākara’s commentator and interpreter, who wrote a seminal essay on sentence meaning in the eighth or ninth century (see Chapter 13 in this volume). Another was Jayanta himself. His discussion of sentence meaning in Racemose Reasoning is clearly responding, in the first instance, to the radical contextualism of Prabhākara, and his final position is quite close to Prabhākara’s. “I don’t accept the ‘expression of relational meanings,’” he writes toward the end of his discussion, “but if you want to call it ‘the conveyance of relational meanings,’ go ahead.” He covers much of the same ground that Śālikanātha had, although there is no clear evidence that he had read Śālikanātha’s writings.

At the time that Jayanta was writing, say around 900 CE, the contextualism of Prabhākara was just beginning to make an impact. Earlier theorists of literature, such as Udbhata (late eighth century), had gotten their Mīmāṃsā, and therefore their theories of sentence meaning, from Śabara and Kumārila. This is true, as far as we know, of Ānandavardhana as well, and also of Jayanta’s contemporary, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. The situation changes completely after Jayanta, who quickly became a point of reference for many intellectuals regarding the theory of sentence meaning.

Jayanta had not only provided a clear presentation of the two competing theories of sentence meaning. He also provided a theory of his own as a kind of compromise. The most important and recognizable aspect of this theory is his introduction of a “power of purport” (tātparyaśaktiḥ), alongside the well-established “power of expression” (abhidhātrī śaktiḥ). The “power of purport” is a term that Jayanta invented, and his trademark contribution to the discussion, although scholarship has not always appreciated this point. Earlier authors had used “purport” (tātparyam), but in a slightly different sense. Literally, the word means “the fact of having that as its main purpose.” Mīmāṃsakas had always held that the main purpose of language, at least the language of the Vedas, is for people to perform the rituals described therein. Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, especially, maintained that an awareness of the practical purpose served by a particular sentence is a prerequisite for understanding that sentence’s meaning, which proceeds in a top-down rather than bottom-up manner. They argued that the meaning of a word is a relational meaning, that which a word contributes to a hierarchically organized structure whose main purpose (tātparyam) is some specific action, rather than its non-relational meaning, which is the mere association that the word has when uttered independently of any particular sentence. For Jayanta, the purport was
the overall meaning of a sentence, that which the speaker ultimately intended
to communicate. Yet, because the expressive power of words, he maintained,
was exhausted in communicating their non-relational meanings, he thought
that there must be an additional power that is responsible for conveying the
relation of the word meanings to each other, and hence the speaker’s purport.
This he called “the power of purport.”

He claimed that two powers, that of expression and that of purport, cooperated
in conveying the meaning of a sentence in a two-stage process. In the first stage,
the “power of expression” (abhidhātrī śaktiḥ), is responsible for expression as
traditionally conceived, namely, calling a signified to mind in the presence of a
signifier:

To the domain of the “power of expression” belong not relational meanings,
but the proper meanings of words that have been isolated through positive and
negative concomitance.⁸

The “proper meanings” he mentions here are clearly non-relational. They are
similar to dictionary definitions. By positive and negative concomitance, that
is, by looking at the contribution that a particular word makes to a sentence
meaning across all of its occurrences, we can determine a stable semantic value
for that word. At the end of the first stage, we have word meanings such as
these, and perhaps some idea as to how they can be fit together—since some
grammatical relations are explicitly expressed, for example, by affixes—but no
sense of an overarching structure of meaning into which they can be integrated.

In the second stage, the “power of purport” (tātparyaśaktiḥ) supplies
precisely this overarching structure:

The “power of purport,” by contrast, extends to relational meanings, since it
operates together with the power of expression, and its operation extends to the
production of an awareness that has no unresolved dependencies.⁹

Jayanta is here referring to the traditional definition of the sentence in Mīmāṃsā,
which is defined by the unity and independence of its meaning: within a
complete sentence, any dependency that one word has for another, such as a
transitive verb for a direct object, is resolved in that very sentence, whereas
if the sentence is incomplete, at least some of those dependencies will remain
unresolved.¹⁰ Independence, in terms of having no unresolved dependencies,
is a characteristic of sentence meaning. Since the power of expression is blind
to the dependencies of the meanings that are expressed—as Jayanta says in the
following summary verse, the meanings it expresses are “either complete or
incomplete”—an additional power is required, in Jayanta’s view, to account for this characteristic:

Cognitions that arise from other sources of knowledge, and that present a stable meaning that is either complete or incomplete, operate in one way; completely different is the verbal cognition that extends over its objects, terminating in the production of an awareness that has no further dependencies on the part of the listener.¹¹

Having very briefly examined Jayanta’s theory of sentence meaning, we can now return to literary theory. We will compare those fragments of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s Mirror of the Heart that speak of rasa as a sentence meaning with the celebrated presentation of rasa as a sentence meaning in Dhanaṅjaya’s Ten Dramatic Forms and especially Dhanika’s Observations. As noted above, there is a clear line of influence from Nāyaka to the sons of Viṣṇu. But they are nevertheless separated by a century. Jayanta’s influence is very clear on Dhanaṅjaya and Dhanika, whereas Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s fragments bear no trace of the influence of Jayanta, or indeed of Prabhākara, who began the contextualist revolution. The question of what conceptual resources Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka drew upon, or even what resources he was in a position to draw upon, is a difficult one, and even after Sheldon Pollock’s painstaking reconstruction of the major themes of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s thought, only provisional answers are possible. It is, nevertheless, important to appreciate Jayanta’s influence on Dhanaṅjaya and Dhanika, because it allowed them to conceive of sentence meaning, and thus of rasa, in a way that was evidently not available to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.¹²

It may be that this is a distinction without a difference. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka certainly did have a concept of sentence meaning, even if he didn’t call it “purport.” When Dhanika invokes “the power of purport” in support of his claim that rasa is a sentence meaning, is he really saying something all that different from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka? I have to admit that I myself see Jayanta’s interventions in the theory of sentence meaning as largely terminological rather than conceptual. Nevertheless, there are two reasons for focusing on these seemingly terminological differences. The first is the philosophical significance of the theory that is at stake. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, using whatever resources were available to him, made one attempt to develop of a theory of meaning that could accommodate affective states. A century later, and using a new set of resources, Dhanaṅjaya and Dhanika took another pass. Were either of them successful? The second is my suspicion that what really distinguishes Dhanaṅjaya and Dhanika from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is not necessarily Jayanta’s calling card, the
power of purport, but a more general insight that Jayanta himself had taken over from Prabhākara: language is only language in use, and in order to be used, there must always be something for language to do (kāryam). Whereas Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka invoked the special power of the Vedas to get its listeners to actualize its meanings, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika merely need to remind us that in every single use of language—whether in the Vedas, or in literature, or in everyday life—there is always something to be done.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka believed that rasa was an experience that the reader had in response to the artful presentation of aesthetic elements in the literary text. He could think of rasa as similar to sentence meaning for two reasons. First, he borrowed from Mīmāṃsā—and probably more specifically from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa—the idea that a sentence meaning is fundamentally oriented toward action. Suppose someone hears the sentence “One who desires heaven should sacrifice with the full- and new-moon sacrifices.” If he recognizes himself as one who has both the desire for heaven and the entitlement to perform the ritual, he will be motivated to undertake it. And when he performs the ritual, he “actualizes” the result that is described in the sentence. In the same way, when one hears a work of literature, provided some additional conditions are met, he “actualizes” the rasa by experiencing it. Ritual and literary texts therefore issue, in similar ways, in the “actualization” of something that is encoded textually. And in both cases, the thing that is actualized is the key to the meaning of the text—the purpose to which all of the other elements are subordinated. If one conceives of meaning as a blueprint for actualization of this sort, rather than merely the content of a cognition, then it seems possible for rasa to be the meaning of a text.13

Two verses of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s appear to make this point. The first is fragment #13, according to Pollock’s numeration:

Rasa, manifested by the configuration of aesthetic elements, the object of a supreme awareness, and an experience consisting in savoring, is said to be the “meaning of the literary text.”14

It is not entirely certain that this verse is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s. I will not go into its textual and contextual problems, which Pollock have been discussed at length in Pollock 2012. My reading and translation differs from his in a number of details.15 Most notably, he translates artha- as “purpose.” Against the background of Mīmāṃsā, this word may well have the sense of “purpose” as well as “meaning.” We can find two clues in this verse, however, that suggest that Nāyaka actually did claim that rasa is the meaning, and not just the purpose, of a literary text.
First, at least in the version transmitted by Mahima Bhaṭṭa, there is the claim that rasa is manifested by a particular configuration of aesthetic elements. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka argued that what Ānandavardhana called “manifestation” was nothing more than what he called “expression,” but he was evidently happy to continue using the term. To say that rasa is manifested by the aesthetic elements is to say that we, as readers, owe our awareness of rasa to these elements. There is a parallel here with a traditional account of sentence meaning, according to which it consists in a conjuncture (samsargah) of word meanings. Although only implicitly referenced by the word “configuration” (samyojanā) here, it will be explicitly referenced in the next fragment. Hence both rasa and sentence meaning share a kind of compositionality, in the weak sense that the character of the whole is determined by the character of its parts.

Second, it appears to contain the claim that rasa, like meaning, is the object of an awareness. I read the end of the first line, somewhat counterintuitively I admit, as an endocentric compound (“an object of awareness”) rather than an exocentric compound (“its object is awareness”). That is first of all because the first half of the line refers to the manifestation of rasa, and what is manifested can thereby become an object of awareness. Secondly, however, I understand the three qualifications of rasa in this verse to correspond to the three stages of aesthetic experience in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory. First, it is “expressed” by the literary text; second, it is “actualized” when the reader apprehends it by means of a special kind of awareness in which the differences between the apprehending subject and represented object are neutralized; and finally, it is experienced by the reader as a particular kind of affective state. When read this way, the verse addresses what we had earlier noted was a major problem with conceiving of rasa as a meaning: rasa is an experience, whereas meanings are cognitive objects. Rasa is a cognitive object at the beginning of the aesthetic process, and an experience at the end.

Finally, to say that rasa is the “meaning” of an entire text may seem somewhat strained, in comparison to the claim that rasa is the “purpose” of the text, in the sense of the goal which the poet strives to achieve throughout the text. But the difference between the meaning of a sentence and the meaning of an entire text is quantitative rather than quantitative. Mīmāṃsā is clear that any textual unit, insofar as it is really a “unit,” has the same hierarchical organization that characterizes the sentence. Mīmāṃsā licenses us, in determining the meaning of a particular linguistic expression, to look beyond it, in ever-expanding concentric circles, until all of the dependencies are resolved, and in particular,
its requirement for an overarching purpose is met. The purpose of a text is indeed its meaning.

In another verse of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s, numbered #12 by Pollock, the parallelism between rasa and sentence meaning is made crystal clear:

Just as a sentence meaning in the Veda is thought to be the conjuncture, or whatever one wishes to call it, of word meanings—since, in view of its connection with a result, there must only be a single meaning for a given sentence—so too are the rasas, such as the erotic, here in literature.

My translation reflects my interpretation of this verse as an analogy between rasa and sentence meaning, rather than an identification of them. Rasa in literature is like sentence meaning in the Veda. In both cases, they are constituted out of a “conjuncture” of other elements. These are the aesthetic elements in the case of rasa and word meanings in the case of sentence meaning. The verse gives a reason why each of them is thought of in this way, which requires a bit of explanation. One popular definition of a sentence was a “group of words,” and sentence meaning could be defined along similar lines as a “group of word meanings.” Why, after all, should we refuse to identify a sentence meaning with its constituent word meanings, and instead opt for something above and beyond the word meanings, such as their “conjuncture”? The reason is that a sentence meaning has to be single. Thus the conjuncture of word meanings is a possible candidate, whereas the word meanings themselves, because of their plurality, are not. And why does sentence meaning have to be single? Mīmāṃsakas maintained that the actualization of the meaning of a sentence—in effect, the performance of the sacrifice that a Vedic sentence enjoins—resulted in the production of one and only one result. The result may be final, such as heaven, or rain, or a son, or cattle, or it may be intermediate, helping to achieve a final result through some sacrificial procedure or another. But the sentence provides a blueprint for action, and that action is characterized by the production of a single result. The case of rasa is similar: although rasa is communicated through multiple elements, it is nevertheless said to be single, because the result of “actualizing” the rasa is also single, namely, the aesthetic experience itself.

We can make a few observations about this verse. First, it is intentionally vague about what we should actually identify with sentence meaning, no doubt reflecting Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s awareness that thinkers had advanced different candidates. One ancient grammarian, Vājapyāyana, had identified sentence meaning with the conjuncture (samsargah) of word meanings, and another, Vyādi, had identified it with their mutual difference (bhedaḥ) (Kunjunni Raja
1963, 191–92). Second, despite this show of agnosticism, the reasons that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka adduced make it clear that the theory of sentence meaning he has in mind comes from Mīmāṃsā. More specifically, it probably comes from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who had actually identified sentence meaning with the actualization (bhāvanā) of a particular result (phalam), with which both of the earlier theories, conjuncture and difference, are compatible. In Kumārila's thought, the result is the most important element in the structure of sentence meaning. The same is not true in Prabhākara's interpretation. He had held that the result was but a subsidiary element of sentence meaning, the principal element being an obligation (niyogah) or “something to be done” (kāryam). This suggests that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka either did not know of Prabhākara or ignored him on this topic. The fact that he refers to sentence meaning as “conjuncture and so on” is another piece of evidence, even more circumstantial, for the same conclusion: after Prabhākara, and especially after his commentator Śālikanātha, almost everyone spoke of the “relation” (anvayah) between word meanings, and the earlier term, “conjuncture,” came to have an old-fashioned ring. Finally, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka analogizes rasa to sentence meaning, not in general, but specifically in the Veda. This is probably because the model he invokes was designed specifically for Vedic texts. By contrast, the model developed by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, building on the insights of Prabhākara, was intended to apply to all sentences, whether Vedic or not. Hence Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka understands rasa in a way that presupposes an acceptance of a hermeneutics especially tailored to the Veda. This maneuver put a Jain author like Hemacandra in an awkward position: he wanted to present and defend Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory without relying on the example of Vedic hermeneutics.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka here shies away from the claim that rasa is actually a sentence meaning. Instead, he claims that rasa is like a sentence meaning in a number of respects. Although it is itself singular, the awareness of it is produced by a conjuncture of different elements. These elements—the aesthetic elements in the one case and the word meanings in the other—are themselves communicated through linguistic expressions. It is, moreover, organized around the actualization or production of something, which is the object for the sake of which the ritual is performed in the case of Vedic sentences, and the aesthetic experience itself in the case of literature.

In spite of these similarities, and in spite of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's identification of rasa as “the meaning of the literary text” in the previously discussed fragment, a number of conceptual obstacles remain for the equation of rasa and meaning. Some of them have to do with the fact that Nāyaka, in offering a reader-
centered and phenomenological account of *rasa*, broke decisively from an earlier tradition that Pollock has usefully characterized as “text-centered” and “formalist.”

Thus, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka might have responded to Ānandavardhana’s argument that *rasa* cannot be expressed by saying that *rasa* unfolds in a process wherein it is first expressed and then experienced. In that case, however, the meaning that is expressed in the first stage is not really *rasa*, and the *rasa* that is experienced in the second stage is not really a meaning. Moreover, if what the text means is simply defined as that which the reader experiences, then is there any principled distinction at all between meaning and response? Is it really equivalent to say “this is what the text means” and “this is what it means to me”? Finally, it may be that some of the conceptual difficulties don’t have to do with the application of *rasa* to the model of sentence meaning, but with the model of sentence meaning itself. One of the reasons why Prabhākara’s theory received so much attention in the ninth and tenth centuries was because of certain weaknesses in Kumārila’s theory: if sentence meaning really were to arise from the conjunctures of word meanings, then it would not be a “meaning” at all, in the sense of being conveyed by a linguistic expression, but the result of a secondary cognitive process (see Chapter 18 in this volume). Similarly, if *rasa* arises from the conjunctures of aesthetic elements, it is not really expressed by the text, but rather inferred from or suggested by the aesthetic elements themselves, and thus not a “meaning” of the text.

These are some of the difficulties that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s followers might have attempted to address, and in doing so, they might have had recourse to alternative theories of sentence meaning. In his *Observations* on the fourth chapter of Dhanaṇḍa’s *Ten Dramatic Forms*, Dhanika provides a summary of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s views, and in doing so, he enlists the help of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, although he never uses either of their names.

Jayanta’s characteristic idea is that sentence meaning arises at the end of a two-stage process, driven, in the final stage, by language’s “power of purport.” He had not failed to observe that the phenomena that Ānandavardhana ascribed to “manifestation” could be accounted for otherwise, either by his own “power of purport” or, in any case, by a more expansive view of what language in general could do: “This expansive capacity of language also rules out that particular ‘resonance’ which someone else, thinking himself a scholar, had proclaimed.”

In this connection, he cited two examples. The first is the famous Prakrit verse that Ānandavardhana had quoted at the beginning of his presentation of “resonance,” which begins “Go your rounds freely, gentle monk” (*bhama dhammad visaddho*). Ānandavardhana found this example serviceable because
the literally expressed meaning is a command ("go your rounds freely"), whereas the meaning that the reader ultimately understands is a prohibition ("leave immediately"), and he thought that his newly proposed function of language, manifestation, could account for the difference. The second example was not previously quoted by Ānandavardhana. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta seems to have introduced it into the debate. "Don't enter that house, son. Eat poison instead." Here the literally expressed meaning is a command to eat poison, but the reader knows not to "take it literally," as we say. Ānandavardhana might have claimed that this example involves the suggestion of a figure of speech, namely distinction (vyatirekah): going into the house and eating poison are both stupid and self-destructive things to do, but the former is even more so than the latter. Jayanta would claim that the meaning that is "suggested" or "manifested" is nothing other than the overall sentence meaning that is produced, in the second stage, by the power of purport.

In his Observations, Dhanika provides a synopsis of the theory of manifestation in the voice of a proponent of that theory. Ānandavardhana himself, living about a generation before Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and apparently unaware of the contextualist theories on which Jayanta's own position was based, did not anticipate the objection that the overall sentence meaning could, in fact, be identified with what he called the "manifested" meaning instead of what he called the "expressed" meaning. More specifically, using the two-stage model that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta had pioneered, the overall sentence meaning—"leave immediately," and "entering that house is worse than eating poison"—arises in a second stage, which we might call an "all things considered" stage, after the words had conveyed their proper meanings in a first stage. The proponent of manifestation, ventriloquized in Dhanika's Observations, presents this new objection and attempts to respond to it. The issues here are slightly beyond the focus of this chapter, but they are, first, whether the second example ("eat poison") should be considered a case of manifestation by Ānandavardhana's followers, and second, what, if any, differences exist between the meaning that arises in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's second stage, in which the power of purport operates, and the meaning that Ānandavardhana's followers, in the wake of Jayanta, ascribe to a third stage, in which manifestation operates. The proponent of manifestation claims that, in the first example ("wander freely"), the literal meaning on its own constitutes a coherent sentence meaning, and the power of purport "rests" at this meaning. The speaker may well be telling a monk to wander freely. An additional meaning nevertheless arises ("leave immediately"), which can only be ascribed to a third stage beyond that of sentence meaning. By contrast, in
the second example ("eat poison"), the power of purport cannot rest on the literal meaning, because it does not constitute a coherent sentence meaning. Thus the nonliteral meaning ("entering that house is worse than eating poison") is selected as the sentence meaning within the second stage, without the need for a third stage. This, according to the proponent of manifestation, accounts for why the first example, and not the second, exemplifies Ānandavardhana's idea of "resonance." Dhanika quotes two verses from this author, who is otherwise unknown (Observations, 206–07).

While this discussion has little to do with rasa, the proponent of manifestation is nevertheless made to say that rasa could never be a sentence meaning. This is because in the second stage, where sentence meaning arises, the reader does not understand a rasa, but rather understands the various aesthetic elements that will, in turn, manifest the rasa. This is a powerful argument against the equation of rasa and sentence meaning: the same process cannot be responsible both for conveying an understanding of the sentence meaning and for conveying rasa, because the apprehension of rasa is dependent on certain features of the sentence meaning, namely, the factors (vibhāvāh) and the other aesthetic elements.

Dhanika responds to these arguments in two places. First, in a lost work of his, the Analysis of Literature (Kāvyanirnayah), he attacked the distinction between sentence meaning and manifestation that the proponent of manifestation had tried to maintain. In that work, of which he quotes a few verses in his Observations, he followed Jayanta in claiming that the powers of expression and purport alone were sufficient to account for anything that we might like to call a meaning, whether in everyday language or in a literary text. It is not the case that the power of purport comes to rest in a literal meaning in the first example ("go your rounds freely"), and does not do so in the second example ("eat poison"). In both cases, we are carried beyond the literal meaning by a careful consideration of the context.

Second, when commenting on an important verse of Dhanañjaya's Ten Dramatic Forms, Dhanika makes a compelling argument for understanding rasa itself as a sentence meaning—the type of meaning that is conveyed by the power of purport. Dhanañjaya's verse is as follows:

Just as an action—whether directly expressed or understood as being present by virtue of context or some other factor—constitutes sentence meaning when construed with its factors, so a stable emotion constitutes a sentence meaning when construed with the other aesthetic elements.
Pollock has noted that this verse is an elaboration of a verse of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s that was discussed earlier (fragment #12). Whereas that verse, however, identified sentence meaning directly with the conjuncture of word meanings, or something that played a similar role, this verse focuses on the conjoined elements themselves, namely, the action and its factors (e.g., its agent and patient). The relation between an action and its factors has often been taken to be paradigmatic of the relation that holds between word meanings within sentence meaning, however and in whatever terms that relation was conceived (Vājapīyana’s “conjuncture” [samsargah], Vyādi’s “difference” [bhedaḥ], Prabhākara’s “cross-connection” [vyātipañcāha] or “relation” [aṇvayaḥ]). Some authors argued that every single sentence meaning must include a relation of this form.26 There was a debate about whether the relation between elements of meaning needs to be conveyed separately from those elements of meaning themselves, or whether it is sufficient for grasping the relation to grasp the relata, but I am not sure that Dhanañjaya meant to take a position in this debate.27

Dhanañjaya’s verse claims that the aesthetic elements are conveyed to the reader in exactly the same way as word meanings. In fact, they are precisely word meanings. They may not be literally expressed by words in the text, although Dhanika mentions one example where they are: “my beloved bride becomes even more beloved” from Harśa’s Nāgānanda.28 That is to say, they are not necessarily cognized in the first stage. If they are present at all, however, they are inevitably cognized by the second stage, in which the power of purport produces a comprehensive sentence meaning. Even when it is not literally expressed, Rāma’s love for Sītā, for example, can be conveyed as a meaning of the text in precisely the same way that the action of closing is conveyed as a meaning of the sentence “the door, please.”

Note how much the ground has shifted in the century between Ānandavardhana and Dhanañjaya. For Ānandavardhana, it probably would have sounded ridiculous to say that a meaning is expressed at all if it is not literally expressed by a word. That is why he had to invent an entirely new concept of “manifestation” in the first place. Yet, in the wake of Prabhākara, Śālikanātha, and Jayanta, contextualism had become much more prominent in debates around sentence meaning. The meaning conveyed by a sentence, on this view, incorporates smaller elements of meaning of all kinds, both those that are literally expressed, and those that are contextually understood, and hence in order to arrive at a coherent sentence meaning, we crucially depend on the context within which a certain sentence is spoken. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, too, might
have had a contextualist account of sentence meaning in mind, but it is telling that he does not refer to context at all in the available fragments.

So much for the aesthetic elements. Dhanika then argues that the *rasa* which emerges from the mutual relation between these elements is not merely like sentence meaning but is in fact a sentence meaning of a particular kind. His argument relies heavily on Jayanta’s concept of purport. Here is what he says:

Don’t go saying that something which is not actually the meaning of any of the constituent words cannot be the sentence meaning. For the power of purport culminates in something to be done. Let me explain. Every single sentence, whether man-made or not, is oriented towards something to be done. If that were not the case, then we would simply disregard it, like the words of a madman.29

The notion that every sentence culminates in something to be done is particularly associated with Prabhākara and Śālikanātha. When we actually map out a sentence meaning, they argued, this practical element is inevitably at the top, even if it is not literally expressed by something in the sentence—for example, an imperative or optative verb. All of the other elements of meaning must take a subordinate position with respect to it. If we identify sentence meaning with purport, as Jayanta does, then it follows that, until and unless we have identified a structure of meaning with this practical element at the top, we are not in possession of a complete sentence meaning. Take, for instance, the sentence, “Isn’t it hot in here?” The sentence meaning here is not a proposition about the temperature of the room. In most contexts—and remember that Jayanta requires us to understand sentence meaning against a contextual background—the sentence meaning is a polite request to open a window. Until we have understood that practical element, we have only understood a subordinate element of the overall sentence meaning, which theorists have called an “intermediate sentence meaning” (*avāntaravākyārthah*).

If we take the orientation toward “something to be done” to be a universal feature of language, then we must ask: What is to be done in the case of literary language? Here is Dhanika again (*Observations*, 211):

> In the case of literary language, we determine that what is to be done is precisely the production of the bliss proper to it, and we do so on the basis of positive and negative concomitance, for we do not encounter any other motivation for its use, either for the speaker or for the addressee.30

We might be puzzled at how quickly Dhanika appears to have reached the conclusion that aesthetic experience is the only purpose for which literary language is employed. In fact, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika had sarcastically
dispatched an alternative view, according to which literature serves the purpose of moral instruction, at the very beginning of the *Ten Dramatic Forms*. He continues:

It is the stable emotion, conjoined with the other aesthetic elements, that we understand as the cause of the production of this bliss. Hence a particular *rasa* will draw the power of expression of a sentence towards itself until, through conveying at an intermediate stage the other aesthetic elements upon which the various proper meanings expressed in the sentence depend, it leads it to culminate in that very *rasa*. In such a sentence, the other aesthetic elements take the place of word meanings, and the sentence meaning is a stable emotion, such as desire, that is conjoined with them. Hence a literary text, so described, is a work of words and sentences (*vākyapadiyam*), the word meanings being the aesthetic elements, the sentence meanings the *rasas*.

Dhanika is serious about the *rasa* being itself the sentence meaning, in the sense of the final purport, of a work of literature. But you can tell from his comment that “the other aesthetic elements take the place of word meanings” that he is less committed to the idea that the aesthetic elements are literally word meanings. In fact, as Pollock notes here, the other aesthetic elements may actually be sentence meanings, especially when they are communicated by literary ornaments. In such cases, however, they are not the final sentence meaning, which is axiomatically “something to be done,” but only intermediate sentence meanings.

Two features of Dhanika’s explanation here mark it, in my view, not merely as an elaboration of Bhatṭa Nāyaka’s views but as an advance on them. And both of those features derive from the contextualist paradigm championed by Śālikanātha and Bhatṭa Jayanta. The first is the mention of a “dependency” (*apeksā*) between the word meanings that have actually been expressed and the aesthetic elements. Dependency is one of the conditions (*upādhiḥ*, as Śālikanātha calls them) in the mutual relation between elements of meaning that is constitutive of sentence meaning. It is true that Bhatṭa Nāyaka had already invoked the conjunction of word meanings (*saṁsargaḥ*) itself in this connection. Dhanika is simply more explicit about its mechanics: what it means to say that two elements of meaning are conjoined is, at least in part, that one of them has a dependency that is resolved by the other and *vice versa*. The other is a very striking image of the top-down way in which sentence meaning is supposed, on the contextualist paradigm, to work. *Rasa* is the purpose, “what is to be done,” and hence all of the other elements of meaning, be they word meanings or intermediate sentence meanings, are teleologically subordinate to
it. These elements can only enter the structure of the overall sentence meaning insofar as they contribute, in some way, to this goal, the production of rasa. The contribution of each linguistic expression to the overall sentence meaning is its “relational meaning,” that is, its “proper meaning” (svārthah) in relation to the other elements that are present in the complex, hierarchical, action-oriented structure. Directing this entire process, and “drawing the power of expression towards itself,” is rasa.

Thus, using the resources found in the theory of sentence meaning that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta offers in his Racemose Reasoning—which, for its part, was made possible by the contextualist turn of Prabhākara and his followers—Dhanañjaya and Dhanika were able to sharpen two related insights of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka regarding the operation of literary language. The first was that “manifestation,” a modality of language particular to literature, was unnecessary, given that we can account for the apprehension of meaning through the standard modalities of language, even for meanings we might describe as nonliteral, suggested, or implicit. This insight required, however, that we provide a more robust account of those standard modalities. It also implied that, contrary to what Ānandavardhana had claimed, rasa itself, or at least the aesthetic elements that served as its precursors, could be expressed as the meaning of a text. Jayanta’s top-down model, where the principal element in the structure of meaning was the purpose for which the text was composed, provided a suitable justification for the equation of rasa with sentence meaning. There remained, however, the distinction between meaning as a cognitive object and rasa as an affective state. This is where Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s second insight comes in: rasa is actually an experience that the reader has, and although the process begins with understanding rasa from the text as one of its meanings, indeed as its principal meaning, it culminates in the “actualization” of that rasa in the reader. In using the language of actualization, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka meant for us to think of rasa as a result for which the text offers a kind of blueprint. Dhanika, while maintaining this terminology, had reinforced Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s insight by speaking of rasa as the keystone in the hierarchical and action-oriented structure of meaning that was increasingly coming to be called the “purport” (tātparyam) after Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. Rasa, or more precisely the experience thereof, was “something to be done,” around which, and for the sake of which, all of the other elements of meaning in a text took their place.

The story of the intersection of these two lines of thought, one focused on the question of aesthetic experience, and the other on the mechanics of sentence meaning, by no means ends with Dhanika. Bhoja, who wrote one generation after him, similarly aimed to synthesize rasa with the theories of sentence
meaning developed by Śālikanātha and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, both of whom he quoted extensively. But it was Abhinavagupta, an exact contemporary of Dhanika, who was perhaps most concerned to reconcile rasa with a comprehensive theory of meaning. This concern is most clearly evident in the first chapter of his commentary, called the Eye, on Ānandavardhana’s Light on Resonance, which evinces a deep familiarity with Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s work. There he reprises some of the arguments that Dhanika had put into the mouth of the proponent of manifestation in his Observations, such as the following:

He who thinks that even here suggestion is nothing more than tātparyaśakti (the power of the sentence meaning) does not know the truth of the matter. For in a sentence that conveys the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, the tātparyaśakti exhausts itself in giving the syntax (samsarga) [of the sentence] or its difference [in meaning from that of other sentences]; it does not concern rasa, the essence of which consists in the process of relishing. Let us say no more.34

This criticism is perhaps fair when it is read against Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s own comments on the power of purport, which he had advanced precisely in order to account for that feature of sentence meaning, whatever we want to call it, that is not reducible to the individual word meanings. Yet when this theory is enhanced with the features that Dhanika had emphasized—the fact that the sentence meaning is always “something to be done,” and the fact that the experience of a rasa proceeds from its being comprehended as a sentence meaning—it is not clear that the power of purport should be limited in the way that Abhinavagupta wants, nor that that the expression of rasa through the power of purport excludes its being experienced.

Notes

1 When I presented a very early version of this chapter at the SAPHALA workshop in Vienna in December 2017, I had not taken Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s influence on Dhanika very seriously. I was encouraged to think harder about the (now embarrassingly clear) evidence for this influence and what it entailed for Dhanika’s aesthetic theory by a number of participants in that workshop, including especially Daniele Cuneo, Hugo David, and Alessandro Graheli. This chapter owes its present form largely to their suggestions. I, of course, take responsibility for all mistakes and defects in the argument.
2 Controversially because another eminent theorist, Bhaṭṭa Udbhāta, had indeed argued that rasa can be communicated by its “proper linguistic expressions.” See Pollock 2016, 70–71.

3 Although nothing, of course, prevents an affective state itself from being an intentional object: one can talk about emotions without experiencing them.

4 These two ways of thinking about sentence meanings are modeled on the two ways of thinking about propositions adumbrated in Kaplan 1989, 494, one defined by truth-conditional semantics (in Kaplan’s case, possible-world semantics), and the other defined as “structured entities looking something like the sentences which express them.”

5 This is the view of Kane 1961, 244–46, with which Pollock 2016, 154–55 largely agrees. The colophon of the text identifies Dhanaṅjaya as a member of the court of Vākpati, who ruled from 972 until he was captured by Tailapa in the early 990s. One manuscript of the *Observations*, and one inscription referred to by Kane, identifies Dhanika, too, as an administrator (mahāśādhyapāla-) of Vākpati, and Dhanika once quotes a poem of Vākpati in his *Observations*. Dhanika also quotes the *Deeds of Navasāhasāṅka* by Padmagupta, which relates the story of Vākpati’s successor, Sindhurāja or Navasāhasāṅka, and which was probably composed around 1010 CE. Dhanika and Dhanaṅjaya both call themselves “son of Viṣṇu,” which makes it likely they were brothers, or possibly the same person. Bhoja, the successor of Sindhurāja, quotes Dhanika’s poetry, but never refers to either the *Ten Dramatic Forms* or the *Observations*, which is somewhat mysterious. See the discussion by Pollock 2016, 155 and Cox 2016, 58.

6 *Racemose Reasoning*, vol. 2, 218: tenānvitābhidhānam hi nāsmābhir iha mrṣyate / anvitatropatipattis tu bādhham abhyupagamyate //

7 See Graheli 2016 for tātparyam. In the introduction to their translation of the *Light on Resonance*, Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan claimed that “the school of ritualists founded by Kumārila held that there existed a third power which furnished a ‘final meaning’ to the sentence as a whole. They called this the tātparyaśakti, and defended its reality against their opponents, the Prabhakara ritualists, who claimed that the denotative force in each word kept on operating until at the conclusion of the sentence it worked automatically in harmony with the other words” (Ingalls et al. 1990, 14).


10 *Mimāṃsāsūtra*, 2.1.46: arthaikatvād ekām vākyam sākāśam ced vibhāge svāti. “It is a single sentence, on account of its single meaning, if it would have unresolved dependencies if it were divided.”

12 In several publications, Pollock speaks of the “older theory by which the final purport of a sentence is produced (tātparya), to which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka as a Mīmāṃsaka was committed” Pollock 2012, 235; see also Pollock 2010, 178. Mīmāṃsakas no doubt made use of similar concepts, such as overall meaning (paryayavināma), but the use of the concept of tātparya specifically is, as noted above, a hallmark of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, and not found in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s fragments.

13 See Pollock 2010; David 2016; Ollett 2016; Pollock 2016, 144–54.

14 Critical Analysis of Manifestation, 70; see also New Dramatic Art [2nd ed.], vol. 1, p. 277 or New Dramatic Art [4th ed.], 271. bhāvasamyojanāvyavagoparasatvīvittigocaraḥ / āśvādanāṁ abhavato rasah kāvyārtha ucye //. For reasons given below, the conjectural reading bhāvasamyojanāvyavagah may be preferable. Pollock (2012, 242) takes Abhinavagupta’s reading and translates it differently: “The purpose of literature is rasa, which is an experience consisting of savoring; it may be said to be ‘manifested’ only by way of a manifestation called awareness, and its domain is the highest consciousness.” The translation in Pollock 2016, 149 is identical.

15 There are two issues. First is the difference in the reading between Abhinavagupta (saṁvedanākhyayā) and Mahima Bhaṭṭa (bhāvasamyojanā). I think Mahima’s reading makes much more sense, and hews more closely to what we know of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s thought, and is less likely to have suffered corruption than the corresponding passage in Abhinavagupta. Second, Hemacandra, in his paraphrase of Abhinavagupta’s discussion, oddly substitutes the verse discussed below (saṃsargādir) for this one. I do not see it as quite as much of a non sequitur as Pollock does.

16 See the verse quoted by Jayanta (Racemose Reasoning, vol. 2, 218): prakṛtipravayavat padavapakṣetvaparacaram / padam padāntaram tad tad vākyam vākyāntaram tathā // “Just as there is mutual dependency between a derivational base and a suffix, so there is between a word and another word, and a sentence and another sentence.” Similarly see Kumārila, Explanation of the System, 453.

17 saṃsargādir yathā śāstra ekatvā phalayogataḥ / vākyārthas tad tad evātra srīgārādi raso mataḥ // Pollock 2016, 149 translates: “Just as in the Veda, where sentence meaning arises through the syntactic construal of the constitutive words—since that meaning must be a unity, given that it bears a relation to a single result—so in literature we hold rasa to constitute a kind of sentence meaning.” See also Pollock 2010, 164.

18 See Explanation of the System, 445: bhāvanaiva ca vākyārthah svakārakaviśeṣāt, “sentence meaning is simply the actualization qualified by its factors.”
19 Whereas Abhinavagupta (possibly although not certainly echoing Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) likened the aesthetic experience to the performance of a Vedie sacrifice on the basis of hearing Vedie texts that commended it, Hemacandra had to substitute the use of a particular mantra on the basis of hearing Jain scriptures wherein the mantra is said to have worked. See Ollett 2016.

20 See, for example, Pollock 2012, 234.

21 Mahima Bhaṭṭa has a very interesting way of reading suggestive verses, in which an inevitable suggestion, one which the reader is invariably led to in order to make sense of the meanings presented in the text, really does belong to the text itself, while a suggestion that depends on the reader’s training, suspicion, conventions, and so on cannot properly be said to belong to the text itself. See Critical Analysis of Manifestation, 469.

22 Racemose Reasoning, vol. 2, 218: etena śabdāśāmarthyaḥmahī so ’pi vāritaḥ / yam anyah pāṇḍitamānyah prapeke kaṃcaṇa đaṇvānīm //


24 Observations, 206: rasāvākyeṣu ca vibhāvaprātipattilakṣaṇadvitīyakakṣāyāṃ rasānavaṇgamāt.

25 Ten Dramatic Forms, v. 4.37, pp. 211–212: vācyā prakaranādibhyo buddhistarvā vā yathā kṛiyā / vākyārth̺haḥ kārakair yuktā sthāyī bhāvas tathētārāh // Translation modified from Pollock 2016, 170. Besides removing Pollock’s quotation marks around “sentence-meaning,” I have changed the translation in order to make it clear that kṛiyā and kāraka refer to word meanings, and not to words. Words, such as nouns and verbs, are not expressed, but word meanings are.

26 Notably Śālikanātha, in his Straightforward and Lucid Commentary, 383, yatāpy arthāntaram nāsti, yatāpy antato ’stvārthena vyatīṣaktaḥ, “in the end, even where there is no further meaning, the meaning of the verb ‘exists’ is cross-connected with it.”

27 Jayanta took the first position, evidently in opposition to Śālikanātha, who took the second.

28 The translation (of prītyai navodhā priyā) is from Pollock 2016, 170.

29 Observations, 211: na cāpadārthasya vākyārthavām nāstītī vācyam, kāryaparyavāsyāīvāt tātāparyasaktāḥ. tathaḥ hi—pauruṣeṇām apauruṣeṇām vā sarvām vākyām kāryaparam. aṭṭaparate ’nupādeyatvād unmaṭīdīvākyavat.

30 kāvyasaṁbutānāṁ cānvaivyavatreyābhāyāṁ nirātisāsakahāvādyavatiśyenā pratipādyavapratipādakaḥ pravṛttivisāvaprayojanāntarānupalabdeḥ / kāvyasaṁbutānāṁ ca svānandodbhūt eva kāryaśaṅvadādhyate. I have accepted Pollock’s interpretation of nirātisāsakahāvādyavatreyena as an intrusive gloss. I agree with Bhaṭṭa Nṛsiṃha’s interpretation of pratipādyavapratipādakayoḥ as “the addressee and the speaker,” the two parties among whom a purpose, or motivation, for the use of language must always be sought. Pollock’s translation (2016, 171)
is: “In the case of the language of literature, we must conclude that its ‘action-outcome’ is nothing other than arousing the bliss proper to it, since positive and negative evidence reveals no other performance-oriented purpose with respect to its signified and signifier.”

31 Ten Dramatic Forms, p. 5 (1.6): āṇandaniṣyandisu rūpakesu vyutpattimātraṁ phalam alpabuddhiḥ / yo ‘pīthāsādīvad āha sādhus tasmai namaḥ svādapaśāmakhyāya // “Reverence to that good man who could be so small-minded as to say that the only result we get from stage plays, which surge with bliss, is moral instruction, like the epics, and who turns his back on savoring this bliss.”

32 tadbhūtinimittavam ca vibhāvādisamsṛṣṭasya sthāyina evvāgamyate. ato vākyasyaḥbhidhāsaktaḥ tena tena rasenākṛtyamānā tattatsvārthāpektāvānta raviḥśvādipratipādana-dvārā svaparyavasāyitām ānīyate. tatra vibhāvādayaḥ padārthaḥstānyaḥ, tatsamsṛṣṭo ratyādir vākyārthaḥ. tad etat kāvyam vākyapadiyam. tāv imau padārthavākyārthau. Pollock (2016, 171) translates: “As for this outcome, it arises, we come to understand, when the stable emotion is ‘syntactically construed’ with the aesthetic elements. Accordingly, the expressive capacity of such a ‘sentence’ is elicited by a given rasa, and eventuates at last in producing it through communicating the specific aesthetic elements appropriate to its particular character. In this process, they elements may be taken to stand for words, while the stable emotion syntactically construed with them forms a sentence meaning. Thus, literature as such is a Vākyapadiya, a work concerned at once with word and sentence, the ‘words’ and ‘sentences’ being those just indicated.” This translation makes it appear as if Dhanika was presenting an analogy, whereas it seems to me that he actually meant to identify rasa as a sentence meaning.

33 These three conditions (dependency, proximity, and compatibility) feature prominently in the theory that would come to be associated with Prabhākara, the “expression of relational meanings,” although they are listed, as far as I know, for the first time in Kumārila’s Explanation of the System. See my other essay in this volume (Chapter 13).

34 Eye on the Light on Resonance, 84: yas tv atrāpi tātparyaśaktim eva dhvananaṁ manyaṁ sa na vastutattvavedī. vibhāvānubhāvapraptādake hi vākye tātparyaśaktir bhede sāmsrge vā paryavasyet. na tu rasyamānatāsāre rasa ity aḷaman bahunā. The translation is from Ingalls et al. 1990, 110.

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