

the center stage of the state and of religion in Korea” (p. 338). This also answers the question that the author posed at the beginning of the book as he declares: “it is Korean Buddhist monks who benefited more than Japanese Buddhist missionaries from the relationship in the pre-and early colonial period” (p. 349).

The author has done admirable work in offering detailed information about the evolution of events and the major figures of the time so that the reader can have a more nuanced picture of the interaction between Koreans and Japanese. He repeatedly emphasizes throughout the book that the one-dimensional evaluation of victimizer and victim in the context of Japanese and Korean Buddhism cannot do justice to what was taking place, since it was a time charged with political (imperialism) and religious (revival of Buddhism, missionarism, sectarian expansionism, introduction of Christianity) complexity combined with the desire of individuals to benefit from or challenge the reality of the historical moment. Reading the conclusion of the book, one wonders whether its core question might risk undermining its very claim. The author unambiguously concludes that Korean Buddhism benefited more than Japanese Buddhism in this encounter.

If we can answer the question “who benefited from the historical moment” in this clear manner, then how is this project different from the black-and-white historiography that the author claims to challenge? A different historiography would focus on different aspects of historical reality and its diverse ramifications. When we judge a certain historical moment with the idea of discovering “benefit,” then we need to ask what defines a “benefit” and whether it is to be considered positive or even desirable. In addition, any discourse on benefit will also require a discussion of who may have suffered from it. The author argues that to consider Korean Buddhism a mere victim of Japanese imperialism deprives Korean Buddhism and Korean monks of their “agency.” Paying more attention to the diverse activities of Korean Buddhists at the time could have been a more effective way of demonstrating Korean Buddhists’ exercise of their own agency in history.

Despite these questions, the book serves as an important step in challenging the long-standing dualistic view of the relationship between Korean and Japanese Buddhism during the pre- and early colonial periods and sets a new horizon against which we should understand modern Korean Buddhism.

Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā: Including an Edition and Translation of Rāmānujācārya’s Tantrarahasya, Śāstraprameyapariçcheda. By Elisa Freschi. Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture 17. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012. €135,00; \$180.00, ISBN 978-9-004-22260-1.

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Rāmānujācārya’s *Tantrarahasya* is a systematic overview of Mīmāṃsā that was produced in South India some time between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, according to Elisa Freschi’s assessment in *Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prābhākara*

Mīmāṃsā: Including an Edition and Translation of Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya, Śāstraprameyapariccheda (p. 10). The fourth chapter, an edition and facing-page translation of which forms the basis of this book, concerns "what the Vedas allow us to know" (*śāstraprameya*).

Freschi has chosen a manner of presentation that succeeds in making accessible the debates that Rāmānujācārya participated in. These debates, while often abstruse and technical, address topics that were—and are—nevertheless of foundational importance: the capacity of language to cause us to act, the nature of duty, the procedure of interpretation, and the roles of desire and duty in the discharging of our obligations. The text comes with three apparatuses. The first is dedicated to variant readings. The second presents *in toto* the passages that Rāmānujācārya has quoted or adapted from earlier authors. The third presents "parallel passages," and serves as a helpful and impressively broad concordance of what other Mīmāṃsakas have said about the topics under discussion. Freschi notes in parentheses the Sanskrit equivalents of key words, and supplies in square brackets all kinds of information that might help the reader to understand the Sanskrit text: labels for the argumentative positions (*pūrvapakṣa*, etc.), the referents of pronouns, and even missing steps in the argumentation. The edition and translation is preceded by a long (149 pages) introduction, organized thematically rather than as a running commentary, that explains the basic concepts and points of debate in the text. The book includes a glossary that focuses on the technical terminology of ritual and an index that focuses on names. There is a detailed table of contents that reflects the highly rational organization of the book.

Rāmānujācārya seems to conform to a pattern among early modern scholars of Mīmāṃsā. His only other work, the *Nāyakarātna*, is a commentary on Pārthasārathimīśra's *Nyāyaratnamālā*, which presents and defends the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in a series of thematic essays. The *Tantrarahasya* explicitly aims to synthesize "the two schools" (*tantradvaya*), Prabhākara's and Kumārila's, from the perspective of the former. In the fourth chapter, the synthesis takes the form of a separate presentation of first the Bhaṭṭa perspective, represented primarily by Pārthasārathimīśra, and then the Prabhākara perspective, represented primarily by Śālikanāthamīśra. For Rāmānujācārya, these seem to be argumentative positions in a fractured intellectual landscape. What was truly a matter of conviction was liberation, and not the matters on which Kumārila and Prabhākara differed. Freschi briefly notes (p. 7) that other "later" Mīmāṃsakas, such as Āpadeva, share a broadly theistic outlook, in contrast to the atheistic tenor of Mīmāṃsā as a system. What Freschi does not elaborate on in this book, but which she has begun working toward in more recent publications, is what it meant to "do Mīmāṃsā" in the intellectual contexts of South India to which Rāmānujācārya almost certainly belonged, and particularly the context of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. A related question, raised incessantly by the parallel passages in the apparatus, is how Rāmānujācārya's project relates to the efflorescence of scholarship on Mīmāṃsā that took place in Benares in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Until the intellectual history of Mīmāṃsā makes further progress, it will not be possible to explain Rāmānujācārya's positions by appeal to his convictions

qua Mīmāṃsaka (e.g., p. 112), or even identify some of his interlocutors (e.g., the *abhiyuktas* mentioned on p. 281, whom I am inclined to believe are lexicographers rather than Vaiṣṇava saints).

As with many of these later scholars, Rāmānujācārya's intellectual output included something like a beginner's textbook or "study guide." What distinguishes Rāmānujācārya, and what makes Freschi's contribution valuable, is that he takes pains to motivate both the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara positions and to state clearly where they differ. On several occasions (e.g., pp. 184, 295), Rāmānujācārya's summary of Śālikanātha has allowed Freschi to clarify exactly what the latter's position is.

Freschi's close examination of Rāmānujācārya's sources has also allowed her to highlight some of his original contributions. One example is his classification of prescriptions. Freschi notes (p. 95) that Mīmāṃsakas classified prescriptions according to at least two distinct schemas. One distinguishes between unprecedented, restrictive, and exclusive prescriptions (*apūrva-*, *niyama-*, and *parisaṅkhyāvidhi*), and another between prescriptions of origination (*utpatti*), application (*viniyoga*), responsibility (*adhikāra*), and performance (*prayoga*). In the Bhāṭṭa *pūrvapakṣa* (pp. 242–252), Rāmānujācārya folds one of these schemas inside the other by making the unprecedented and restrictive prescriptions subtypes of the prescription of origination, and by jettisoning the exclusive prescription altogether. He then follows Pārthasārathimīśra in attempting to motivate the fourfold classification by treating them as different "stages" on the way to the actual performance of the sacrifice, such that the prescriptions at each stage depend on—or license us to postulate—prescriptions of the other stages. In the Prābhākara *siddhānta* (pp. 322–324), however, Rāmānujācārya devises a completely novel classification by applying Pārthasārathi's theory of "stages" to the characterizations of prescriptions available in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, such that a prescription is successively "what enjoins" (*niyoga*), "what incorporates" (*grāhaka*), "what applies" (*viniyojaka*), and "what effectuates" (*prayojaka*).

The "hermeneutical circle" discussed on pages 46–52 is another example of the value added by Freschi's commentary. She presents the Prābhākara's dilemma as follows: If we learn how to use language from worldly experience, and if Vedic language by definition conveys something apart from worldly experience, we will never be in a position to understand what the Vedas say. Freschi then explains how Rāmānujācārya gets out of the circle. From worldly experience, one gains the idea that exhortative expressions convey an action that is to be performed (*kriyākārya*). Such a meaning cannot be attributed to certain exhortative expressions in the Vedas, such as "one who desires heaven should sacrifice," because the action spoken of (sacrifice) cannot itself be connected to the result mentioned (heaven), since the action ceases long before the putative result comes into being. Therefore we determine that what is conveyed by such expressions is an *ought* that lies outside our experience (*apūrvakārya*). The final bold move is for Rāmānujācārya to claim that *apūrvakārya* had *always* been the primary meaning of exhortative expressions, and that their meaning in worldly experience is a mere secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) based on the fact that in the world an *ought* (*kārya*) commonly inheres in an action (*kriyā*).

Rāmānujācārya thus explains how we can “bootstrap” from the kinds of obligations discussed in everyday life to the kinds of obligations that the Veda uniquely makes us aware of.

Freschi’s introduction can stand alone as an accessible review of Mīmāṃsā’s hermeneutical concerns. There are a number of insightful comparisons with modern philosophical theories and formalisms, some of which, however, are too brief (e.g., the telegraphic gestures to Austin on p. 43 and Bocheński on p. 62). I commend Freschi’s attempt to show that Mīmāṃsā’s hermeneutics has philosophical dimensions that should be brought into larger conversations, even if the problematic concept of free will (p. 120) or von Wright’s formalization of Thomist deontics (pp. 124–127) do not immediately help us to understand the positions that Rāmānujācārya represents. The charts that Freschi supplies are, on the one hand, necessary for representing the hierarchical structure of language and ritual that it is the entire task of Mīmāṃsā to explicate; on the other, Freschi rarely explains precisely what relations the arrows signify. At times the distinctions could have been more sharply drawn between the various words that Prābhākara uses to talk about the content of Vedic prescriptions. For example, Freschi writes (p. 45) that “what must be done, the *ought*, can only be grasped through the Sacred Texts” and that “[i]t is therefore called *a-pūrva*, i.e., ‘un-precedented’ by any other instrument of knowledge.” The problem is rather that the *ought* (*kārya*) is in fact grasped outside the context of the Vedas (as in, “I ought to go to the store”). The Prābhākara thus needs to reconcile his position that the Veda tells us about something, namely *dharma*, that we would not know about from any other source, with his position that exhortative expressions principally convey this *ought*.

My final minor criticism concerns the “paraphrases” (*vivaraṇas*) of prescriptions that Freschi has ventured independently of other Mīmāṃsakas. On page 25, *śābdī-* and *ārthībhāvanā* are joined incoherently (and ungrammatically), since it is the Vedas, and not the person addressed by the injunction, that bring-into-being the bringing-into-being of heaven on the part of the person addressed by the injunction. On page 88, the paraphrase does not reflect the role of the verbal root in supplying both the content (*viśaya*) and instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) to the supermundane duty (*apūrvakārya*) denoted by the optative ending.

My criticisms of the translation are very few. Freschi distinguishes (p. 102) two meanings of *pra-yuj*, namely “promote” and “perform,” without explaining what it would mean for a prescription to “promote” the performance of a sacrifice. Freschi might have noted that *prayojaka* in this sense contrasts with *prayujyamāna*; that is, it is a superordinate agent that causes a subordinate agent to perform an action. “Appropriateness” is less specific than *aidamarthya* (pp. 359 ff.), which is a condition of standing in a teleological relationship that must be “fulfilled” (*nirvāha*) in the construal of all prescriptions. “Injunctive sentence” is also less precise than *codaka* (p. 261), which is a rule of transference of elements from the archetype into the ectype. Rāmānujācārya has a straightforward and clear style, and it is only when the point of his discussion turns on minor but important details (as it does on pp. 358–362) that I felt the absence of detailed explanatory notes to the text itself.

Regarding the constitution of the text, it seems unlikely that the manuscript *M* that Freschi collated for this edition is different from the manuscript on which the *editio princeps* (1923) was based, which was also a palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu script at the Government Oriental Library in Mysore. Freschi's stemma requires us to assume that the GOL lost (!) the hypothetical exemplar of the *editio princeps*. Further, the differences between the *editio princeps* and *M* all seem to be either emendations or mistakes on the part of the editor (including the omission of a line on p. 310, where the editor's eye appears to have jumped from *niyojyo* to *niyojyaḥ* in the following line).

This book is a welcome contribution. It is, vacuously, the most significant work on Rāmānujācārya since Ramaswami Shastri's edition of the *Tantrarāhasya* in 1953. Although less comprehensive, it does for Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā what Edgerton's version of the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaparakāśa* and Benson's recent (2010) version of the *Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha* have done for Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, namely to make these valuable overviews of their respective systems available to a wider audience. The introduction manages both to prepare the reader to engage with the text and to raise a number of thought-provoking questions about Mīmāṃsā's hermeneutical program in general. The philosophical problems, such as how we can be made to know things, and even do things, that are beyond the horizon of our experience, are clearly set out, and thus, even if Rāmānujācārya does not answer them conclusively and convincingly, we can look forward to further discussion about them. Questions of intellectual history are raised only very occasionally and tentatively. The book is therefore a first step toward including Rāmānujācārya within a broader history of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, and including Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā within the intellectual and religious horizons of India in the centuries just before colonialism.

Dōgens Sprachdenken: Historische und symboltheoretische Perspektiven (Dōgen's language thinking: Systematic perspectives from history and the theory of symbols). By Ralf Müller. *Welten der Philosophie*, vol. 13. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2013. Pp. 376. €49, ISBN 978-3-495-48610-8.



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Dōgen studies have prospered in the academies of America and Europe for over three decades, and in Japan much longer. There hardly seems to be a year that does not see several monographs or collections published on the subject, and many issues continue to draw scholarly attention. Of paramount importance among these is, without doubt, Dōgen's perspective on language.

The well-established state of the field notwithstanding, Ralf Müller's debut monograph is a most welcome contribution. It stands out by virtue of its fresh and