

MDES W2041: INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Spring 2015 ☞ MW 2:40–3:55 ☞ Knox Hall 103

ANDREW OLLETT (aso2101@columbia.edu) ☞ IAB 270

OFFICE HOURS: F 11:00–12:00 and by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is a historical and thematic introduction to India's major philosophical traditions. India is popularly imagined to have lots of religion but not much philosophy. But where are the lines drawn, and why? What do we mean by "philosophy"? What were the principal "knowledge-systems" in India, and what is or isn't philosophical about them? What were their principal concerns? How are these systems organized individually, and how do they interact with each other? What are the forms and genres through which philosophy was practiced? What were its styles and methods of presentation, argumentation, and debate? We address these questions through a very selective survey of themes and questions. This survey is intended to represent something of the sophistication and range of philosophical discourse in India, including thinkers from many different schools and traditions.

Two complementary perspectives will frame our discussion of what Indian philosophy is over the duration of the course. According to the first, which is an "outsider's" perspective, we are interested in what is "philosophical" about Indian traditions of systematic thought. To what extent are their questions like those of philosophical traditions—such as those addressed in Contemporary Civilization—that may be more familiar? What do they contribute to discussions, both historical and contemporary, about (for example) the relationship between language and thought? And in what ways do they broaden "philosophy" into a global and comparative enterprise of reasoned enquiry and debate? The second is an "insider's" perspective: what were the problems by which Indian knowledge systems defined themselves—however unphilosophical they might at first seem to us, such as the interpretation of Vedic texts—and how did these traditions evolve in their own cultural and historical context?

No knowledge of any Indian languages is required, and no prior coursework in philosophy is presupposed.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the end of this course, students should:

- be familiar with the principal *traditions* of Indian philosophical thought;
- be familiar with the basic contours of the *history* of Indian philosophy;
- be familiar with the *positions* in significant debates in the history of Indian philosophy;
- be able to *relate* ideas and concepts from Indian philosophy to similar ideas and concepts from other philosophical traditions;
- have a broader, more inclusive, and more comparative conception of "philosophy";
- have an appreciation for, and sensitivity to, the intellectual traditions more generally of India and the non-Western world.

FORMAT/ORGANIZATION

The schedule of readings can be found below. There is also a [Google calendar](#) that lists the readings and assignments for each class:

https://www.google.com/calendar/embed?src=r08uk10oqn3d03ecfkmerso2b4%40group.calendar.google.com&ctz=America/New_York

Readings will be posted in the “Files & Resources” section of CourseWorks. Each class session has its own folder. The files are also named by date, so 20150121 (etc. etc.) names a reading that should be prepared for January 21, 2015. The number after the date is the suggested reading order. Before each class, you will usually post a question to the Discussion Board on CourseWorks (see below) which will help to guide the in-class discussion. Class sessions will typically begin with a short lecture, but the rest of the time will be spent in seminar-style discussion.

ASSIGNMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS

Discussion questions. Typically you will post a *brief* (< 100 words) discussion question based on your reading of the assigned texts to the Discussion Board on CourseWorks by *12:00 noon on the day of class*. These questions should generate discussion; “How can Vasubandhu speak of non-perception of mind, as though the mind itself were an object of perception, after speaking about it as the condition that makes perception possible?” might be a good question; “What are the ‘three supreme Buddha-bodies’ that Vasubandhu refers to in verse 38?” might not be. You should feel welcome to bring comparative material into these questions.

For certain classes we will do other types of exercises instead of the discussion question (see the week-by-week schedule for details), no more than one page in length.

Midterm examination. We will have an in-class midterm on March 11, 2015. You will pick one of two essay questions to answer; the focus will be on describing, analyzing and relating the ideas we have encountered so far. Midterms will be evaluated for command over the course content, including the correct use of terms and concepts.

Final paper. An essay of 8–10 pages will be due by the end of the semester (May 15, 2015). You may choose your own topics, but *I must approve all paper topics* by April 22 at the latest. You are strongly encouraged to meet with me in the second half of the semester to discuss your final papers. These are *not* research papers, although you are welcome to engage with literature that we have not covered in class (e.g., supplementary readings). Papers will be evaluated for command over the course content, for quality of interpretation, analysis, and argumentation, and for a compelling synthesis of themes we have discussed in the course.

Do not hesitate to speak to me if you have any questions about the assessment standards.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

Completing the readings and participating in in-class discussions counts for 40% of the final grade. “Participation” includes the short assignments for each class that are listed under “assignments” in the week-by-week schedule and calendar. The midterm examination counts for 25%. The final paper counts for 35%.

POLICIES AND PROVISIONS

Since this is a participation-driven course, absences will lower the participation grade unless they are announced to me in advance. (You will still have to complete the short assignment—usually a discussion question—for the classes from which you will be absent.) *You may miss one short assignment with no penalty.* The second missed assignment must be made up with a 400-word *précis* of the reading. No incompletes will be given.

Students must adhere to the University’s [Academic Integrity Policies](#). Special accommodations can always be made on the advice of the [Office of Disability Services](#) and/or the Dean of Students: students are requested to contact these offices *as soon as it becomes necessary*. Students may also make use of the [Writing Center](#) (310 Philosophy).

WEEK-BY-WEEK SCHEDULE

Refer to the bibliography for **readings**. The readings and assignments are also posted in the course calendar ([here](#)). Supplementary readings are always optional; references for these readings are given in the bibliography, but I have not made them available through CourseWorks.

Note: Good translations of philosophical texts in Sanskrit are difficult to come by. Philosophical texts in Sanskrit are often extremely dense, technical, and sometimes purposely unintelligible without a commentary, and translations render their technical terminology inconsistently. Many of the translations here are by scholars for whom English is a second (or fourth or fifth) language. The primary-source readings are thus relatively short but relatively difficult. Don’t despair: we will discuss them extensively in class.

WEEK 1

January 21, 2015 – Introduction

Questions: What is philosophy? What is Indian philosophy? What are its major sources? How do we know about it, study it, and engage with it? How does it relate—historically and comparatively—to other philosophical traditions? What is its status today?

Readings: Krishna, “Three Myths”; Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (the introduction to the section on “Indian Philosophy,” pp. 125 –128).

Assignment: None

Supplementary Readings: Matilal, “Preface” in *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar*; Halbfass, “Exclusion”

WEEK 2

January 26, 2015 – The Will to Know

Questions: Why undertake “philosophy”? What were the preconditions for participating in it? How and in whom does the desire for knowledge arise? How does one orient oneself in a field of philosophical discourse?

Readings: *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.1.1 of Jaimini, Śabara’s *Commentary* (Bhāṣya) on this sūtra, and selections from Kumārila’s *Verse Explanation* (Ślokavārttika), verses 11–25, 124–128.

Assignment: Discussion question

January 28, 2015 – Reasoning about Reasoning

Questions: How does one do philosophy? What is (or isn’t) “rational” about the discursive

practices spoken of in the Nyāya system? In what contexts, and for what purposes, are these practices deployed?

Readings: *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.1 of Akṣapāda Gautama, with Vātsyāyana's *Commentary* (Bhāṣya) on this sūtra; Keśava, *Exposition of Reasoning* (Tarkabhāṣā), §§3–16 (pp. 84–104)

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Matilal, “The Nature of Philosophical Argument”

WEEK 3

February 2, 2015 – Inference's Three Conditions

Questions: What is the role of inferential knowledge, and how does it work? What are the conditions of a well-formed inference? What kind of abstraction, representation, or formalization will allow us to speak in universal terms about the validity or invalidity of inferential knowledge?

Readings: Gillon, “Logic”; Dinnāga, *The Wheel-Drum of Reasons* (*Hetucakraḍamaru); focus on the text, pp. 12–28.

Assignment: Discussion question, OR, rephrase Dinnāga's three conditions in a formal language of your choosing.

Supplementary Readings: Staal, “*Pakṣa*”

February 4, 2015 – Criticism of Dinnāga's Model

Questions: What kinds of inferences is Uddyotakara at pains to reintroduce after Dinnāga? What is the role of negation and quantification in these inferences? Do his refinements extend or restrict the sphere of valid inference in any way?

Readings: Uddyotakara, selection from *Explanation* (Vārttika) on *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.5, pp. 172–177, 188–194.

Assignment: Discussion question

WEEK 4

February 9, 2015 – The Language of Analysis

Questions: How did the “New Philosophers” attempt to formalize the language of philosophical analysis? What are the key concepts and techniques of this formal language? What are its presuppositions (either about ontology or about language and representation)? How does it compare to other formal languages in philosophical analysis?

Readings: Wada, “The Analysis of Relation,” and selections from Ingalls, “Theories and Techniques” (§§1–2, §§15–19, §§27–28, §33).

Assignment: We will split into small groups (3 or 4 people). Each group should come up with a clear and coherent presentation of *one* of the concepts in the below list, and submit it to me by the usual time (12:00 noon on the day of class). Try to come up with intelligible examples. Other formalizations (e.g., propositional logic with quantifiers) may be helpful but by no means necessary. We'll go over these assignments in class. A look at Ganeri (below) may prove helpful. **Concepts:** Qualifier and Qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*); Universal (*sāmānyaljāti*); Nominal property (*upādhi*); Substratum and Superstratum (*ādhāraladhikaraṇalāśraya, ādheya*); Delimitor (*avacchedaka*); Descriptor (*nirūpaka*); Absence (*abhāva*); Universal-positive (*kevalānvayin*); Counterpositive

([*abhāvīya-*]pratiyogin); Occurrence (*vr̥ttitva*).

Supplementary Readings: Ganeri, “Technical language”

February 11, 2015 – Invariable Concomitance

Questions: What is *vyāpti* (“pervasion,” “invariable concomitance,” “inferential warrant”)? What conditions must it satisfy? How is knowledge of *vyāpti* achieved? And what conditions must a philosophical definition of the phenomenon satisfy?

Readings: Gaṅgeśa, selections from the *Debate on Pervasion* (Vyāptivāda) [a section of his master-work, the *Wishing-Stone of Philosophical Principles* [Tattvacintāmaṇi]: ch. 4 (§§6–9), ch. 1 (entire), ch. 4 (§§12–13), ch. 5 (entire), ch. 7 (§§6–7). **Note:** This is a very difficult text, and we won’t worry too much if we don’t get to Gaṅgeśa’s alternate definitions in ch. 7.

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Ganeri, “Logical Theory”

WEEK 5

February 16, 2015 – The Emptiness Argument

Questions: How can claims that deny the very possibility of truth be true? What does it mean for something—a phenomenon, an entity, a claim, a discourse—to be “empty”? What are the motivations for emptiness within Buddhism? How can some form of valid knowledge be recovered from emptiness?

Readings: Nāgārjuna, *Dispeller of Disputes* (Vigrahavyāvartanī), verses 1–2, 5–6, 21–24, and 29–51 (with commentary).

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Garfield and Priest, “The Limits of Thought”

February 18, 2015 – Constructedness and Emptiness

Questions: How, and why, does Vasubandhu elaborate the phenomenological and ontological aspects of emptiness? Why is he worried about dualism between subject and object? How, and how successfully, does he manage to avoid or sublimate it?

Readings: Vasubandhu, *Treatise on the Three Natures* (Trisvabhāvanirdeśa)

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Gold, “Vasubandhu’s *Yogācāra*”

WEEK 6

February 23, 2015 – Buddhist Views on Perception

Questions: What is a *pramāṇa* (“knowledge-instrument,” “source of valid knowledge,” “doxastic practice,” “epistemic practice”)? What is perception, and what are its objects and limitations? How does Buddhist epistemology, as sketched by Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti, relate to the Buddhist ideas we’ve encountered so far of what is or isn’t “out there” in the world?

Readings: Dharmakīrti, *A Drop of Reasoning* (Nyāyabindu), ch. 1, with Dharmottara’s *Notes* (Ṭīkā); read all of Dharmakīrti, which is the text in a larger typeface, and for Dharmottara, focus on 7.21–9.2 [pp. 19–24], 10.8–11.13 [pp. 26–30], and 12.11–16.14 [pp. 33–46]; McCrea and Patil, “Dharmottara’s Epistemological Revolution”

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Dunne, “Pramāṇa Theory”

February 25, 2015 – Conceptual Content in Perception

Questions: What does Kumārila disagree with in the account of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti? How and why does he propose to make concepts into objects of perception? What kinds of concepts are they? How does Kumārila’s argument affect the relationship between perception and inference?

Readings: Kumārila, *Verse Explanation* (Śloka-vārttika), from the Perception chapter, vv. 111–128 [pp. 93–101], vv. 247cd–254 [pp. 145–148]; from the Class chapter, vv. 1–18 [pp. 281–284]; from the Forest chapter, vv. 13–34 [pp. 331–334].

Assignment: Discussion question

WEEK 7

March 2, 2015 – Kumārila’s Anti-Foundationalism

Questions: What confers “validity” on a claim, cognition, or belief? How do we adjudicate between competing cognitions in real life? How do the procedures of justification and evaluation relate to the ways in which beliefs arise, or the way in which they are held? How general is the theory of “intrinsic validity,” and what are its liabilities?

Readings: Arnold, *Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief*, pp. 61–73, 89–97

Assignment: Discussion question

March 4, 2015 – Against Error

Questions: What are the major points of disagreement in the definition of a *pramāṇa*? What are the cognitive experiences that Śālikanātha takes into consideration, and what epistemic status does he accord them? What is a “valid but mistaken” cognition? Why does Śālikanātha object to the standard accounts of cognitive-epistemic error, and what does he replace them with?

Readings: Śālikanātha Miśra, *Review of the Pramāṇas* (Pramāṇapārāyaṇa)

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: McCrea, “The Transformations of Mīmāṃsā”

WEEK 8

March 9, 2015 – The Metaphysics of Error

Questions: What can the experience of error tell us about the way the world is set up? How can epistemic indeterminacy be related to ontological indeterminacy? How does Vācaspati’s non-realist account of cognition differ from Vasubandhu’s? Does it succeed in avoiding the “infinite regress” of cognitions that threatened Kumārila?

Readings: Ram-Prasad, “Vācaspati”

Assignment: Discussion question

March 11, 2015 – MIDTERM EXAMINATION

The midterm will cover material from the beginning of the course to March 9. You will choose *one* of *two* essay questions to answer, and you will have the whole class time (ca. 1 hour) to write the essay.

[SPRING BREAK: MARCH 16 TO MARCH 20]

WEEK 9

March 23, 2015 – Non-Dualism

Questions: What is “superimposition,” and why does Śaṅkara think that it is all-pervasive? What is the Self, what are Śaṅkara’s and Sureśvara’s reasons for differentiating it from the individual ego? How, metaphysically and in our linguistic usage, are these two entities related? What is the duality which non-dualism (*advaita*) is a negation of?

Readings: Śaṅkara, *Commentary* (Bhāṣya) on the Brahma Sūtras, pp. 3–9; Sureśvara, *Against Action* (Naiṣkarmyasiddhi), 2.54–66, 2.96–111.

Assignment: Discussion question

March 25, 2015 – Inferring God

Questions: Does God exist? How could we be in a position to know? What constraints does Udayana put on inferential arguments for God’s non-existence? How does this argument differ from theistic arguments from traditions outside of South Asia? Is inferential knowledge in general determinate or probabilistic, and what confidence can we have in that knowledge?

Readings: Udayana, *A Bouquet of Flowers of Reasoning* (Nyāyakusumāñjali), pp. 212–251.

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Patil, “Against *Īśvara*”

WEEK 10

March 30, 2015 – The Permanence of Language

Questions: What is the nature of the relationship between words and their meanings? What does Kumāriḷa—and others—have at stake in this relationship? What is the ontology of language—where, for whom, in what sense does it exist? Why does Kumāriḷa insert a long discussion of the non-existence of God into his discussion of language?

Readings: Kumāriḷa, *Verse Explanation* (Śloka-vārttika), *Refutation of the Objection to the Connection between Words and Meanings* (Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra).

Assignment: Discussion question

April 1, 2015 – Theories of Sentence-Meaning

Questions: How do we go from word-meanings to sentence-meanings, or *vice versa*? What kinds of accounts are the two competing theories of sentence-meaning? Do they refer to the *construction* of meaning on the part of a speaker, the *analysis* of meaning on the part of a listener, or something else? How do these accounts link to the theme of valid knowledge?

Readings: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *A Bouquet of Reasoning* (Nyāyamañjarī), pp. 842–862.

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Taber, “The Theory of the Sentence”; McCrea, “The Transformations of Mīmāṃsā”

WEEK 11

April 6, 2015 – Aesthetic Experience

Questions: What is *rasa*? For whom, in whom, and how does *rasa* “arise”? What are the difficulties with assimilating aesthetic experience to the cognitive-epistemic framework with which we’ve been operating so far? What are the new frameworks that Śrī Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka propose?

Readings: Abhinavagupta, *The New Dramatic Art* (Abhinavabhāratī), pp. 29–63.

Assignment: Discussion question. Also, please begin thinking about your final paper topics,

and meet with me over the next few weeks to discuss them: *I must approve all paper topics.*

Supplementary Readings: Pollock, “Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka”

April 8, 2015 – Aesthetic Experience

Questions: How can we characterize Abhinavagupta’s account of *rasa*? How do its various components—its hermeneutics, its phenomenology, its focus on receptivity or sensitivity, its sociology—fit together? How, in the end, does aesthetic experience relate to the “real” world?

Readings: Abhinavagupta, *The New Dramatic Art* (Abhinavabhāratī), pp. 63–105.

Assignment: Discussion question

WEEK 12

April 13, 2015 – Pluralism of Practice

Questions: What does “practice” mean in the context of Indian philosophy? Can philosophy itself be viewed as a practice, or does it presuppose or complement other practices? How should we view attempts like Haribhadra’s to define a practice that crosses sectarian boundaries?

Readings: Haribhadra, *Collection of Views on Yoga* (Yogaḍṛṣṭisamuccaya)

Assignment: Discussion question

April 15, 2015 – Principled Pluralism

Questions: What models of truth underlies the Jain ideas of perspectivism (*nayavāda*), non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*), and sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*)? Do these add up to a useful evaluative framework for competing philosophical claims? Or a formal framework for maintaining civil and productive discussion among different traditions?

Readings: Siddhasena Divākara, *Right-Minded Reasoning* (Sanmatitarka), vv. 1.1–21, 3.43–55; Matilal, *Anekāntavāda*, ch. X (pp. 41–46) and ch. XIII (pp. 54–56)

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Ganeri, “Jaina Logic”

WEEK 13

April 20, 2015 – Qualified Pluralism

Questions: How do philosophical reasoning and traditional religious practice complement or compete with one another in Jayanta’s text? What is the social role of intellectuals, and what forms does public reasoning take, in the world that Jayanta describes?

Readings: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Much Ado About Religion* (Āgamaḍambara), Acts I–II.

Assignment: Discussion question

April 22, 2015 – Qualified Pluralism

Questions: What are conditions that Jayanta places on toleration and pluralism? Are they formal or substantive? And are toleration and pluralism themselves first-order philosophical values, or are they compromises made for political and social reasons? Who and what in the end are included under Dhairyaṛāśī’s “big tent”?

Readings: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Much Ado About Religion* (Āgamaḍambara), Acts III–IV.

Assignment: Discussion question. This is also the last day to talk to me about your final paper topics.

WEEK 14

April 27, 2015 – Making History

Questions: How do we tell the history of Indian philosophy? Is it a history of schools, doctrines, traditions, or people? What kind of *temporality* does Indian philosophy have? How, if at all, should we speak of continuity and discontinuity, tradition and innovation, premodernity and modernity?

Readings: Ganeri, “India Expanding”

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Franco, “Periodization”

April 29, 2015 – Making Systems

Questions: How did philosophical systems view themselves in relation to others? What were the relevant differences? What differences were *irrelevant*? What are the underlying principles according to which knowledge of philosophical systems is organized? What do these systematizations exclude?

Readings: Haribhadra, *Collection of Six Viewpoints* (Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya)

Assignment: Discussion question

Supplementary Readings: Halbfass, “Sanskrit Doxographies”; Nicholson, “Doxographies”

WEEK 15

May 4, 2015 – Review

Today we will try to produce a systematic overview of “Indian philosophy,” or whatever else we decide to call this field of discourse. How should we represent it? Should it be hierarchical, like traditional doxographies? How can we capture the coherence of systems while also capturing their mutual interation? How might we represent historical change, moments of transformation and innovation?

Assignment: Send me a *one-page* description of a school, system, or tradition by the usual time (12:00 noon on the day of class). If you like, you may work in small groups (no more than 2 people per group). We’ll discuss them, and try to put them together, in class.

May 15, 2015 – FINAL PAPERS DUE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Required readings

All of the readings, with the exception of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s *Much Ado About Religion*, will be made available on courseworks. See the week-by-week schedule in the syllabus.

Abhinavagupta, *The New Dramatic Art* (*Abhinavabhāratī*)

Gnoli, Raniero. *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*. Roma: Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956.

Arnold, *Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief*

Arnold, Dan. *Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

- Dharmakīrti, *A Drop of Reasoning* (Nyāyabindu)
 Stcherbatsky, Th. *Buddhist Logic: Volume 2*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1930.
- Dharmottara, *Notes* (Ṭīkā) on *A Drop of Reasoning*: See above.
 He, Huanhuan and Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp. “Once Again on the *Hetucakraḍamaru: Rotating the Wheels.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (2014).
- Diñnāga, *The Wheel-Drum of Reasons* (*Hetucakraḍamaru)
 He, Huanhuan and Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp. “Once Again on the *Hetucakraḍamaru: Rotating the Wheels.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (2014). [Published online without page numbers.]
- Ganeri, “India Expanding”
 Ganeri, Jonardon. “India Expanding.” pp. 11–60 in *The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India, 1450–1700*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 [2011].
- Gaṅgeśa, *The Debate about Pervasion* (Vyāptivāda) in the *Wishing-Stone of Philosophical Principles* (Tattvacintāmaṇi)
 Goekoop, C. *The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1967.
- Gautama [Akṣapāda], *Nyāya Sūtras*: See Vātsyāyana, *Commentary*
- Gillon, Brendon. “Logic”
 Gillon, Brendon. “Classical Logic” in “Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy.” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [[Here.](#)] in “Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy.”
- Haribhadra, *Collection of Six Viewpoints* (Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya)
 Qvarnström, Olle. “Haribhadra and the Beginnings of Doxography in India.” pp. ??? in Sushil Kumar, Narendra Wagle, Olle Qvarnström, and Nalini Balbir (eds.), *Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols*. Toronto: University of Toronto Center for South Asian Studies, 1999
- Haribhadra, *Collection of Views on Yoga* (Yogaḍṛṣṭisamuccaya)
 Chapple, Christopher Key and John Thomas Casey (trans.). *Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra’s Collection of Views on Yoga*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Hegel, “Indian Philosophy”
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995 [1892–1896]. [Available [here](#) on CLIO.]
- Ingalls, “Theories and Techniques”
 Ingalls, Daniel Henry Holmes. “An Examination of Some Theories and Techniques of Navya-Nyāya Logic.” Section II of *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Jaimini, *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*: See Śabara, *Commentary*
- Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Much Ado About Religion* (Āgamaḍambara)
 Dezső, Csaba (trans.). *Much Ado About Religion by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta*. New York: New York University Press, 2005.
- Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Bouquet of Reasoning* (Nyāyamañjarī)
 Bhattacharyya, Janaki Vallabha (trans.). *Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāya-mañjarī*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.
- Keśava, *Exposition of Reasoning* (Tarkabhāṣā)
 Jhā, Gangānātha (trans.) *Tarkabhāṣā or Exposition of Reasoning*. Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1967.
- Krishna, Daya, “Three Myths”

- Krishna, Daya. “Three Myths About Indian Philosophy.” *Diogenes* 14 (1966): 89 –103.
- Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Verse Explanation* (Śloka-vārttika)
 For the perception chapter:
 Taber, John. *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumārila on Perception*. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.
 For other chapters:
 Jhā, Gaṅgānātha (trans.). *Ṣloka-vārttika*. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1909.
- Matilal, *Anekāntavāda*
 Matilal, Bimal Krishna. *Anekāntavāda: The Central Philosophy of Jainism*. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1981.
- McCrea and Patil, “Dharmottara’s Epistemological Revolution”
 McCrea, Lawrence and Parimal Patil. “Dharmottara’s Epistemological Revolution.” pp. 16–20 in *Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India: Jñānaśrīmitra on Exclusion*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Nāgārjuna, *The Dispeller of Disputes* (Vigrahavyāvartanī)
 Westerhoff, Jan (trans.). *The Dispeller of Disputes: Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Ram-Prasad, “Vācaspati”
 Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi. “Vācaspati on *anirvacanīyatva*.” pp. 95–130 in *Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
- Śabara, *Commentary* (Bhāṣya) on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*
 Jha, Ganganath (trans.). *Shabara-Bhāṣya* [sic]. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933.
- Śālikanātha Miśra, *Review of the Pramāṇas* (Pramāṇapārāyaṇa)
 [Unpublished translation by AO]
- Śāṅkara, *Commentary* (Bhāṣya) on the *Brahma Sūtras*
 Thibault, George. *The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Saṅkarākārya*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890.
- Siddhasena Divākara, *Right-Minded Reasoning* (Sanmatitarka)
 Saṅghavi, Sukhlālji and Becharādāsi Doshi. *Siddhasena Divākara’s Sanmatitarka*. Bombay: Shri Jain Shwetambar Education Board, 1939.
- Sureśvara, *Against Action* (Naiṣkarmyasiddhi)
 Alston, W. J. *The Realization of the Absolute: The “Naiṣkarmya Siddhi” of Śrī Sureśvara*. London: Shanti Sadan, 1971 [1959].
- Uddyotakara, *Explanation* (Vārttika) of the Nyāya System
 Jhā, Gaṅgānātha (trans.). *The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gauṭama, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārttika of Uddyotakara*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
- Udayana, *A Bouquet of Flowers of Reasoning* (Nyāyakusumāñjali)
 Dravid, N. S. (trans.). *Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayanācārya*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.
- Vasubandhu, *Treatise on the Three Natures* (Trisvabhāvanirdeśa)
 Garfield, Jay (trans.). “Treatise on the Three Natures.” pp. 35 –45 in William Edelglass and Jay Garfield (eds.), *Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Vātsyāyana, *Commentary* (Bhāṣya) on the *Nyāya Sūtras*
 Jhā, Gaṅgānātha (trans.). *Gautama’s Nyāyasūtras [with Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya]*. Poona: Oriental Book

Agency, 1939.

Wada, “Analysis of Relation”

Wada, Toshihiro. “The Navya-nyāya Analysis of Relation.” pp. 24–35 in *The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyāya*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2007.

Supplementary Readings

These are selected from the scholarly literature about specific topics we address in the course. They are not required. See the week-by-week schedule in the syllabus. (I have not included those books or articles that we will read portions of in class.)

- Dunne, John. “Pramāṇa Theory: Dharmakīrti’s Conceptual Content.” pp. 15–52 in *Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy*. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004.
- Franco, Eli. “On the Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy.” pp. 1–25 in Eli Franco (ed.), *Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy*. Vienna: Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, 2013.
- Garfield, Jay and Graham Priest. “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought.” pp. 86–105 in Jay Garfield, *Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. [Available [here](#) on CLIO.]
- Ganeri, Jonardon. “Jaina Logic and the Philosophical Basis of Pluralism.” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 23 (2002): 267–281.
- Ganeri, Jonardon. “Logical Theory and Gaṅgeśa’s Analysis of Inferential Warrant (vyāpti),” in “Analytic Philosophy in Early Modern India.” In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [[Here](#).]
- Ganeri, Jonardon. “The Technical Language Assessed.” pp. 223–236 in *The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India, 1450–1700*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 [2011].
- Gold, Jonathan. “Vasubandhu’s *Yogācāra*: Enshrining the Causal Line in the Three Natures.” in *Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu’s Unifying Buddhist Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
- Halbfass, Wilhelm. “On the Exclusion of India from the History of Philosophy.” pp. 145–159 in *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988 [Available [here](#) on CLIO.]
- Halbfass, Wilhelm. “The Sanskrit Doxographies and the Structure of Hindu Traditionalism.” pp. 349–368 in *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988 [Available [here](#) on CLIO.]
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. “The Nature of Philosophical Argument.” pp. 69–93 in *Perception: Perception: An Essay in Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. “Preface.” pp. xi–xvi in *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- McCrea, Lawrence. “The Transformations of Mīmāṃsā in the Larger Context of Indian Philosophical Discourse.” pp. 129–143 in Eli Franco (ed.), *Periodization and Historiography of Indian Philosophy*. Vienna: Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, 2013.
- Nicholson, Andrew. “Doxography, Classificatory Schemes, and Contested Histories.” pp. 144–165 in *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History*. New York:

- Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Patil, Parimal. "Against Īśvara: Ratnakīrti's Buddhist Critique." pp. 100–194 in *Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- Pollock, Sheldon. "What Was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka Saying? The Hermeneutical Transformation of Indian Aesthetics." pp. 143–184 in Sheldon Pollock (ed.), *Epic and Argument in Sanskrit Literary History: Essays in Honor of Robert P. Goldman*. Delhi: Manohar, 2010.
- Sen, Amartya. "The Argumentative Indian." pp. 1–33 in *The Argumentative Indian*. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2005.
- Staal, J. Fritz. "The Concept of *pakṣa* in Indian Logic." pp. 151–161 in Jonardon Ganeri (ed.), *Indian Logic: A Reader*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001.
- Taber, John. "The Theory of the Sentence in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Western Philosophy." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17.4 (1989): 407–430.

Background Readings

These are general works on Indian philosophy that might prove useful throughout the course. Some of these, however, are very dated, tendentious, uneven, or unreliable, so proceed with caution. (I have not included those books or articles that we will read portions of in class.)

- Bartley, Christopher. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*. New York: Continuum, 2011.
- Edelglass, William and Jay Garfield. *Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Frauwallner, Erich. *History of Indian Philosophy*. Leiden: Brill, 1973–. (2 vols., reprinted in 2008 by Motilal Banarsidass in Delhi).
- Ganeri, Jonardon (ed.), *Indian Logic: A Reader*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001.
- Gonda, Jan (ed.). *History of Indian Literature*. Leiden: Brill, 1974–1986. (10 vols.)
- Gupta, Bina. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge, and Freedom*. New York: Routledge, 2012.
- Kunjunni Raja, K. *Indian Theories of Meaning*. Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Institute, 1969.
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. *Logic, Language and Reality*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008 (5th ed.)
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna. *Perception: An Essay in Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Mohanty, J. N. *Classical Indian Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Müller, Max. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1919.
- Potter, Karl. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970–. (15 vols. so far)
- Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli. *Indian Philosophy: Volume 1*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1923.
- Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Charles Moore. *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.